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The Federal Enforcement Provisions of the 1970 
Amendments to the Clean Air Act: Statutory Scope 
and Constitutionality 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) claims the 
power under the commerce clause and certain provisions of the 
1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act1 to either direct a state to 
enact laws to control air pollution according to EPA standards, 
or to compel the state to administer and enforce regulations as 
promulgated by the EPA.2 
Four states have challenged the EPA's position a t  the circuit 
court level.3 In each of the cases, the plaintiff state had submitted 
implementation plans to the EPA for its approval.~ollowing 
disapproval of certain parts of the state's transportation control 
plan,Vhe EPA issued substitute provisions6 and directed the 
state, under penalty of injunctive and penal sanctions, to comply 
with the plans as altered.' Each state objected, arguing that the 
1. 42 U.S.C. $ 1857 (1970), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964). 
2. 38 Fed. Reg. 30,632-33 (1973). 
3. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 
44 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1976) (No. 75-1055); Maryland v. EPA, 8 ENVIR. REP. 
DEC. 1105 (4th Cir. Sept. 19, 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 7, 
1976) (No. 75-960); Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 
U.S.L.W. 3381 (U.S. Dec. 24, 1975) (No. 75-909); Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d 
Cir. 1974). 
4. 37 Fed. Reg. 10,842 (1972). On May 31, 1972, the Administrator published his 
initial approvals or disapprovals of state implementation plans. Noting, however, that 
neither the EPA nor the states had any practical experience in the development of trans- 
portation control plans, the Administrator permitted the states to defer for approximately 
one year beyond the statutory deadline the submittal of implementation plans. In addi- 
tion, 21 states were allowed 2-year extensions of the deadline for attainment of the primary 
standards. Id. 
On January 31, 1973, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held in 
NRDC v. EPA, 475 F.2d 968,970-72 (1973), that the Clean Air Act does not permit either 
delay in the submission of transportation control plans or the granting of blanket exten- 
sions of the primary standards attainment date. In accordance with the court order, the 
EPA cancelled all extensions and directed the states to submit transportation control 
plans by April 15, 1973 designed to attain the national air quality standards by May 31, 
1975. 38 Fed. Reg. 7323-24 (1973). 
Sixteen states, including three of the plaintiff states, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and 
the District of Columbia, submitted new plans by the April 15, 1973 deadline. California, 
the fourth plaintiff state, failed to submit a new plan. 38 Fed. Reg. 16,550-64 (1973). 
5. 38 Fed. Reg. 16,550-69 (1973). 
6. For a detailed account of all state implementation plans as modified and promul- 
gated by the EPA see 40 C.F.R. $ 52 (1974). In particular see 40 C.F.R. $ 5  52.220-66 
(California); $0 52.470-96 (District of Columbia); $6 52.1070-112 (Maryland); and 4 4  
52.2020-55 (Pennsylvania). 
7. 39 Fed. Reg. 33,512 (1974): 
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EPA lacked statutory authority to compel state implementation 
and enforcement of EPA-promulgated transportation control 
plans? The states also attacked the EPA's constitutional author- 
ity, asserting that Congress cannot use the commerce power to 
require a state to exercise its legislative and executive powers to 
undertake assigned activities, even though federal regulation of 
the activities themselves is within the reach of the commerce 
power.g The states contended that the Tenth Amendment and the 
guarantee clause limit the scope of the commerce power in this 
context. lo 
In the first opinion issued on the point, Pennsylvania v. 
EPA," the Third Circuit sustained the EPA's position. The court 
held that EPA sanctions against Pennsylvania for failure to legis- 
latively implement and enforce federally promulgated transpor- 
tation control plans were both (1) within the scope of the EPA's 
delegated authorityt2 and (2) a valid exercise of the federal com- 
merce power.13 On the other hand, in Brown v. EPA,14 and 
Maryland v. EPA,15 the Ninth and Fourth Circuits substantially 
Failure to comply with any provisions of this part, or with any approved 
regulatory provision of a state implementation plan, or with any permit condi- 
tion or permit denial issued pursuant to approved or promulgated regulations 
for the review of new or modified stationary or indirect sources, shall render the 
person or governmental entity so failing to comply in violation of a requirement 
of an applicable implementation plan and subject to enforcement action under 
section 113 of the Clean Air Act. With regard to compliance schedules, a person 
or Governmental entity will be considered to have failed to  comply with the 
requirements of this part if it fails to timely submit any required compliance 
schedule, if the compliance schedule when submitted does not contain each of 
the elements it is required to contain, or if the person or Governmental entity 
fails to comply with such schedule. 
8. See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d at 831; District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 
at  982. 
9. See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d at 831; District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 
a t  981. 
10. See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 841; Maryland v. EPA, 8 ENVIR. REP. DEC. at 
1112. 
11. 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974). 
12. Id. a t  259. 
13. Id. a t  262-63. The court did go on to say, however, that: 
We recognize that there may remain a legitimate concern for possible intrusions 
upon the proper functioning of our federalist system as a result of future devel- 
opments in the implementation of the Clean Air Act, and this court will remain 
ready to protect that concern in any appropriate case. 
Id. a t  263. 
14. 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3381 (US.  Dec. 24, 
1975) (No. 75-909). 
15. 8 ENVIR. REP. DEC. 1105 (4th Cir. Sept. 19, 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 
U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 7, 1976) (No. 75-960). 
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rejected the EPA position. Recognizing the serious constitutional 
questions raised by the EPA's position and motivated by a desire 
to avoid these questions,lQoth courts ruled as a matter of statu- 
tory construction that the EPA lacked authority to require states 
either to establish or to enforce transportation control plans or to 
impose sanctions on them for failure to do SO.'' In the most recent 
decision on the issue, District of Columbia v. Train,'%he District 
of Columbia Circuit took a middle position..Like the Ninth and 
Fourth Circuits, the D.C. Circuit held, as a matter of statutory 
construction, that the EPA exceeded its authority by ordering 
"the states and municipalities to enact statutes and regulations 
or to take other actions . . . necessary . . . to complete the regu- 
latory scheme. Congress placed these duties on the Administra- 
tor, not the states when state-submitted plans are found to be 
insufficient."lg The court went beyond the holdings of the Ninth 
and Fourth Circuits, however, by finding that the EPA has the 
statutory authority to and may constitutionally compel states to 
administer EPA-promulgated programs directed to a "traditional 
state function."20 
The purpose of this comment is to compare and contrast the 
four circuit court opinions to determine if the EPA can statutorily 
and constitutionally compel states to act pursuant to certain pro- 
visions of the 1970 amendments. The first part of the comment 
will set forth those provisions of the 1970 amendments relevant 
to this issue.21 The next two parts of the comment will treat the 
16. See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d at  837. 
17. Id. a t  831; Maryland v. EPA, 8 ENVIR. REP. DEC. a t  1114. 
18. 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Feb. 
17, 1976) (NO. 75-1055). 
19. Id. a t  986 (emphasis added). 
20. Id. a t  987-88, 992; notes 179-182 and accompanying text infra. Virginia subse- 
quently petitioned the Supreme Court to review this part of the decision. District of 
Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Virginia 
v. Train, 44 U.S.L.W. 3459 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1976) (No. 75-1050). 
In addition to Virginia, the Justice Department sought review of District of Columbia 
v. Train, as well as Brown v. EPA and Maryland v. EPA. In so doing the Justice Depart- 
ment emphasized that review is necessary because of the "widely varying and inconsistent 
conclusions" reached by the different appellate courts. The Justice Department pointed 
out that the constitutional principles involved "are fundamental to the federal system," 
and that "the final resolution of the conflict among the circuits may substantially deter- 
mine what legislative alternatives are available to Congress in the future." The Justice 
Department also asserted that the EPA's authority to require states to enforce transporta- 
tion control plans "is of basic importance to the effectiveness of the Clean Air Act." 6 
ENVIR. REP.-CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 1497 (1975). 
21. For a detailed description of the 1970 amendments see, e.g., Jorling, The Federal 
Law of Air Pollution Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL L W 1058 (E. Dolgin ed. 1974); 
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substantive issues in the same order as they were treated by the 
courts: first, the limits of the EPA's statutory authority, and 
second, the constitutionality of this particular exercise of author- 
ity. 
A. The General Scheme 
Fun~t iona l ly ,~~  the 1970 amendments can be divided into two 
elements: (1) the programmatic element,23 which encompasses 
such matters as federal research24 and technical and financial 
a ~ s i s t a n c e , ~ ~  and (2) the regulatory element, which includes provi- 
sions for the establishment and enforcement of air quality control 
standards.26 Although the .programmatic element of the 1970 
amendments is based on the longstanding doctrine that the regu- 
lation of air pollution is the primary responsibility of states and 
local  government^,^ the scope of the doctrine is substantially 
narrowed by the dual federal-state implementation and enforce- 
ment scheme created in the regulatory element.28 
Keener, A Current Survey of Federal Air Quality Control Legislation and Regulations, 5 
NATURAL RESOURCES LAWYER 42 (1972); Kramer, The 1970 Clean Air Amendments: Feder- 
alism in Action or Inaction?, 6 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 47 (1974); Luneburg, Federal-State 
Interaction Under the Clean Air Amendments of 1970, 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 637 
(1973); Comment, 1970 Clean Air Amendments: Use and Abuse of the State Implementa- 
tion Plan, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 232 (1974); Comment, State Implementation Plans and Air 
Quality Enforcement, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 595 (1975). 
22. Structurally, the Clean Air Act, as amended through 1970, is subdi- 
vided into three titles. Title 1 includes the general policy statements, authoriza- 
tions of programs for financial and technical assistance, research authorizations, 
and the general framework for the control of ambient pollutants and emissions 
from stationary sources. Title 11 includes controls relating to emissions from 
moving sources, primarily automobiles, trucks, and aircraft. Title 111 includes 
general administrative and judicial authorizations. 
Jorling, supra note 21, at  1062. 
23. This comment will not describe the specific parts of the programmatic element 
because most of the issues in the cases arose from the regulatory element. 
24. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1857b (1970). 
25. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. $ 5  1857b-1, 1857i, 1858a (1970). 
26. For discussion see notes 29-49 and accompanying text infra. 
27. 42 U.S.C. $ 1857(a)(3) (1970) represents the first congressional pronouncement 
on the primacy of the state and local role in air pollution control. It was enacted in 1955. 
New language was added by the 1970 amendments asserting the primary state role "for 
assuring air quality" and meeting the national ambient air quality standards. Id. 5  1857c- 
2. 
28. For an excellent discussion of the doctrine of "primary state and local responsi- 
bility" and how this doctrine came to be narrowly applied in the 1970 amendments see 
Kramer, supra note 21, a t  49-67. As Kramer points out, two policies motivated the intru- 
sion into this long standing doctrine: first, the recognition of air pollution as a serious 
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B. Implementation Plans 
An important part of the overall scheme created by the 1970 
amendments is the state formulation of implementation plans 
specifying how air quality standards previously established by 
the EPAZ9 will be achieved, maintained, and enforced in each 
state.30 In pertinent part, section i10(a)(l)31 specifies that 
"[elach State shall . . . adopt and submit to the Administrator 
. . . a plan which provides for implementation, maintenance, 
and enforcement of such primary standard . . . ."32Section 
l10(a)(2)33 and ensuing regulations3' delimit the contents of state 
implementation plans required for EPA approval and set out the 
appropriate time limits35 within which these plans are to be sub- 
national problem, and second, the inability or failure of the states under previous regula- 
tions and acts to cope with the problem. Kramer also speculates, however, whether the 
sponsors of the legislation themselves realized what they had wrought in terms of federal 
enforcment. Id. a t  53. 
29. On April 30, 1971, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 8 1857c-4 (1970), the Administrator 
promulgated national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards for six pollu- 
tants. Primary standards specify the levels of concentration of those pollutants in the 
ambient air above which there are identifiable health effects. Secondary standards protect 
the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated with such 
pollutants. 36 Fed. Reg. 22,384 (1971). "Ambient air" has been defined by the EPA to 
mean that portion of the atmosphere external to buildings to which the general public has 
access. Id. 
30. 42 U.S.C. $ 1857~-5 (1970). 
31. Id. $ 1857c-5(a)(l). 
32. Id.: 
Each State shall, after reasonable notice and public hearings, adopt and 
submit to the Administrator, within nine months after the promulgation of a 
national primary ambient air quality standard (or any revision thereof) under 
section 1857c-4 of this title for any air pollutant, a plan which provides for 
implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such primary standard in 
each air quality control region (or portion thereof) within such State. In addi- 
tion, such State shall adopt and submit to the Administrator (either as a part 
of a plan submitted under the preceding sentence or separately) within nine 
months after the promulgation of a national ambient air quality secondary 
standard (or revision thereof), a plan which provides for implementation, main- 
tenance, and enforcement of such secondary standard in each air quality control 
region (or portion thereof) within such State. Unless a separate public hearing 
is provided, each State shall consider its plan implementing such secondary 
standard a t  the hearing required by the first sentence of this paragraph. 
33. Id. $ 4  1857~-5(a)(2)(A) to -(H). 
34. 40 C.F.R. $ 4  51-52 (1974). 
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(l) (1970). Following state submission of implementation 
plans, the Administrator was given four months to approve or disapprove the plans. Id. $ 
1857c-5(a)(2). 
These strict time limits have received strong judicial support. See, e .g . ,  NRDC v. 
EPA, 475 F.2d 968,970 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The Act provides, however, two exceptions. First, 
the Administrator may extend the 3-year period in which state plans must provide for 
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mitted. After review of a state's plan, the EPA may accept it3' 
and delegate to that state the authority to enforce the plan,37 or 
the EPA may reject part or all of the plan and issue its own 
implementation plan for the state." In either case, the plan be- 
comes federal law,39 enforceable by the EPA pursuant to section 
113.40 
C. Enforcement of Standards and Plans 
Key provisions of the 1970 amendments provide for parallel 
state and federal enforcement of each of the standards in the 
approved implementation plan." The state enforcement mecha- 
nism is governed by section 110(a)(l), but because no specific 
method of enforcement is provided in this sec t i~n , '~  the EPA has 
issued federal regulations to serve as guidelines.'% effect, these 
regulations require the states to "enforce applicable laws, regula- 
tions and standards, and seek injunctive relief."" 
The federal enforcement mechanism is defined in section 113 
of the 1970 amendments, which significantly expands the scope 
and potential effectiveness of federal enforcement. Under this 
attainment of national ambient air quality standards, 42 U.S.C. § 1857~-5(a)(2)(A)(i) 
(1970) for not more than an additional 2 years upon a gubernatorial request for such an 
extension, id. 8 1857c-5(e)(l); and second, the Administrator may extend up to 1 year the 
compliance with any state implementation plan for a source or class of sources, also upon 
gubernatorial request, id. 8 1857c-5(f)(l). For an extensive discussion of these exceptions 
see Kramer, supra note 21, a t  71-75. 
36. 42 U.S.C. $ 5  1857~-5(a)(2), 43) (1970). 
37. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 8 1857c-6(c)(l) (1970) (power to implement and enforce 
standards of performance). 
38. Id. § 1857~-5(c)(l): 
The Administrator shall, after consideration of any state hearing record, 
promptly prepare and publish proposed regulations setting forth an implemen- 
tation plan, or portion thereof, for a State if- 
(A) the State fails to  submit an implementation plan for any national 
ambient air quality primary or secondary standard within the time prescribed, 
(B) the plan, or any portion thereof, submitted for such State is deter- 
mined by the Administrator not to be in accordance with the requirements of 
this section, or, 
(C) the State fails, within 60 days after notification by the Administrator 
or such longer period as he may prescribe, to revise an implementation plan as 
required pursuant to a provision of its plan referred to in subsection (a)(2)(H) 
of this section. 
39. Approval of a plan and the regulations therein results in the adoption of the state 
law as federal law and is considered rulemaking subject to the requirements of the Federal 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§  500-59 (1970). 
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1857~-8 (1970). 
41. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-6(c), -7(d) (1970). 
42. 42 U.S.C. $ 1857c-5(a)(l) (1970). For the text of this section see note 32 supra. 
43. See, e.g., 38 Fed. Reg. 30,632-33 (1973); 40 C.F.R. § 51.11(a)(2) (1973). 
44. 40 C.F.R. § 51.11(a)(2) (1973). 
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section, the EPA has authority, either on its own initiative or 
when a state fails to act, to enforce the plan against any "person" 
in violation there~f.~"'Person" is defined in section 302(e)16 of the 
Act to include any "State, municipality, and political subdivision 
of a State." If a violation is not corrected within a 30-day period 
following notification, the EPA can either issue an order requiring 
compliance or initiate a civil action against the ~iolator .~ '  If a 
compliance order is violated, criminal penalties of up to $25,000 
per day or one-year imprisonment can be imposed.4R If civil action 
is initiated, a court may grant an injunction or any other relief it 
considers appropriate.jg 
45. 42 U.S.C. 8 1857c-8(a)(l), -(2) (1970): 
(1) Whenever, on the basis of any information available to him, the Adminis- 
trator finds that any person is in violation of any requirement of an applicable 
implementation plan, the Administrator shall notify the person in violation of 
the plan and the State in which the plan applies of such finding. If such violation 
extends beyond the 30th day after the date of the Administrator's notification, 
the Administrator may issue an order requiring such person to comply with the 
requirements of such plan or he may bring a civil action in accordance with 
subsection (b) of this section. 
(2) Whenever, on the basis of information available to him, the Administrator 
finds that violations of an applicable implementation plan are so widespread 
that such violations appear to result from a failure of the State in which the plan 
applies to enforce the plan effectively, he shall so notify the State. If the Admin- 
istrator finds such failure extends beyond the 30th day after such notice, he shall 
give public notice of such finding. During the period beginning with such public 
notice and ending when such State satisfies the Administrator that it will en- 
force such plan (hereafter referred to in this section as "period of federally 
assumed enforcement"), the Administrator may enforce any requirement of 
such plan with respect to any person- 
(A) by issuing an order to comply with such requirement, or 
(B) by bringing a civil action under subsection (b) of this sec- 
tion. 
46. Id. § 1857h(e). 
47. Id. § 1857c-8(a)(l), 42).  For the text of these sections see note 45 supra. 
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1857~-8(c)(l) (1970) states in pertinent part: 
Any person who knowingly- 
(A) violates any requirement of an applicable implementation plan during 
any period of Federally assumed enforcement more than 30 days after having 
been notified by the Administrator under subsection (a)(l)  of this section that 
such person is violating such requirement, or 
(B) violates or fails or refuses to comply with any order issued by the 
Administrator under subsection (a) of this section, . . . 
. . . .  
shall be punished by a fine of not more than $25,000 per day of violation, or by 
imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both. 
49. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(b) (1970) states in pertinent part: 
The Administrator may commence a civil action for appropriate relief, 
including a permanent or temporary injunction, whenever any person- 
(1) violates or fails or refuses to comply with any order issued under subsection 
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A. Statutory Construction as a Means of Avoiding 
Constitutional Issues 
It is well settled that federal courts do not pass on questions 
of constitutionality unless such adjudication is unavoidable."' 
Beginning from this premise, each circuit court first considered 
whether the authority delegated to the EPA by the 1970 amend- 
ments included the authority to bring federal enforcement proce- 
dures against states that fail to implement and enforce imple- 
mentation plans. 
Although each circuit followed traditional principles of sta- 
tutory construction in determining the scope of the EPA's author- 
ity, the specific criteria used and the way in which each circuit 
applied the criteria varied substantially. I t  is not within the scope 
of this comment to discuss in any detail the voluminous rules and 
theories dealing with specific criteria of statutory const r~ct ion.~~ 
Rather, the emphasis here is on evaluating each circuit's interpre- 
tation of the 1970 amendments on the basis of five general cri- 
teria: (1) reliance on the plain meaning of the statute; (2) use of 
intrinsic aids of interpretation; (3) recourse to the legislative his- 
tory; (4) deference to the administrative interpretation; and (5) 
recognition of overriding policy considerations. The purpose of 
this evaluation is not to suggest a single proper way of interpret- 
ing the 1970 amendments. Indeed, taken together, the four cases 
aptly support the proposition that "there is no table of logarithms 
for statutory constru~tion."~~ Any final and conclusive interpreta- 
tion must necessarily be left to the appropriate legislative or judi- 
cial body. 
B. Plain Meaning Rule 
The task of statutory interpretation by the judiciary has tra- 
ditionally been preceded by a noninterpretive examination of the 
(a) of this section; or (2) violates any requirements of an applicable implementa- 
tion plan during any period of Federally assumed enforcement more than 30 
days after having been notified by the Administrator under subsection (a)(l)  of 
this section of a finding that such person is violating such requirement; . . . 
50. E.g. ,  Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 (1947). 
51. For an excellent analysis of principles of statutory construction see 2A J. SUTHEH- 
LAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (4th ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as 2A 
SUTHERLAND] . 
52. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 
543 (1947). 
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language in which the statute is framed." "Where the language 
is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of 
interpretation does not arise and the rules which are to aid doubt- 
ful meanings need no discu~sion."~~ Although this deference to 
the "plain meaning" of the words has now generally yielded to 
broader, more "legislative intent" oriented approachesss to statu- 
tory interpretation, it still finds expression in numerous cases.56 
In interpreting the 1970 amendments, each of the cases re- 
stricting the EPA's authority referred to the plain meaning of the 
statute. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit in Brown v. EPA, the 
Fourth Circuit in Maryland v. EPA, and the D.C. Circuit in 
District of Columbia u. Train emphasized that if Congress had 
intended to give the EPA such broad enforcement powers against 
the states, it could have done so in plain words.57 Each court, 
however, found "little in the language of the Act to indicate that 
the Administrator has been empowered to order that legislatures 
and municipal bodies in the states enact statutes and regulations 
or to bring federal enforcement actions against those governmen- 
tal units to do so."58 
A major difference between the three circuits emerges, how- 
ever. The Ninth and D.C. Circuits applied the plain meaning rule 
53. See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 51, 88 46.01-.07. 
54. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917), citing Hamilton v. Rath- 
bone, 175 U.S. 414, 421 (1899). 
55. [Wlords are inexact tools a t  best and for that reason there is wisely 
no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter how 
"clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.' " 
Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476,479 (1943), citing United States v. American 
Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 544 (1940). 
In theory, the "plain meaning rule" implies a preference for an interpretation accord- 
ing to what the statute means, or may be supposed to mean, to those affected by it. In 
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384,396-97 (1951), Justice Jackson 
defended this preference in a dissenting opinion, stating: 
Moreover, there are practical reasons why we should accept whenever possible 
the meaning which an enactment reveals on its face. Laws are intended for all 
of our people to live by . . . . To accept legislative debates to modify statutory 
provisions is to make the law inaccessible to a large part of the country. 
Modern approaches to statutory construction, on the other hand, most often emphasize 
"legislative intent," which implies a preference for the "sending end" of the communica- 
tion as determined by legislative and administrative materials. For a short discussion of 
these differences see 26 TEMP. L.Q. 174 (1952). 
56. See, e.g., United States v. Reid, 517 F.2d 953, 967-68 (2d Cir. 1975) (Mansfield, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), where Judge Mansfield asserts that the plain 
meaning rule is alive and viable. 
57. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d a t  984-86; Maryland v. EPA, 8 ENVIR. EP. 
DEC. at  1114; Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d a t  834-35. 
58. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d a t  986. 
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only to reinforce interpretations arrived a t  by other means." The 
Fourth Circuit, on the other hand, despite avowed reliance on 
principles of statutory con~truct ion,~  appears to have relied on 
the plain meaning rule as the primary basis for its decision." In 
its short, two-paragraph discussion of the statutory authority 
issue, the court concluded that "[tlhe statute in plain words 
authorizes the Administrator to 'prepare . . . regulations . . . for 
a State;' it does not empower him to direct a state to enact its 
own statutes and regulations as prescribed by the Administra- 
tor."E2 Plainly, there is no provision in the Act which states in 
unequivocal terms that a state must implement and enforce its 
own plan or be subject to federal enforcement procedures. How- 
ever, the Fourth Circuit's failure to expressly distinguish convinc- 
ing EPA arguments indicating a contrary legislative intentU seri- 
ously undermines the opinion and points out the inadequacies of 
the plain meaning rule when used as a starting and ending point 
of statutory construction. 
C.  Intrinsic Aids of Interpretation 
The modern starting point of statutory construction is to 
read and examine the act and to draw inferences concerning 
meaning from its composition and structure. Inferences thus 
drawn are referred to as intrinsic aids of interpretation because 
they derive meaning from the internal structure of the text." It 
is with this tool that the EPA most convincingly supports its 
interpretation of the 1970 amendments. The EPA points out that 
- 
59. See notes 69-84 and accompanying text infra. 
60. The court stated: "We are thus of the opinion, and so hold, that the EPA was 
without authority under the statute as a matter of statutory construction." 8 ENVIR. REP. 
DEC. a t  1114. 
61. It may be that the Fourth Circuit relied on other principles of statutory construc- 
tion, but concluded that it was unnecessary to discuss them because the language of the 
statute appeared to the court to be plain and specific. In this context, compare Maryland 
u. EPA with United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210-11 (4th Cir. 1972), where the 
Fourth Circuit cited legislative history in support of its conclusion as to the plain meaning 
of the statute. See also 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 51, § 46.02, a t  52: 
[Lliteral interpretation consists of an approach which (a) concentrates atten- 
tion upon and maximizes the significance of the statutory text, ( b )  takes into 
consideration less rather than more indicia of meaning other than the statutory 
text, instead of not considering such indicia a t  all as is sometimes claimed, and 
(c) often may take extra-textual considerations into account only subconsciously 
or unconsciously rather than deliberately and purposefully. 
62. 8 ENVIR. REP. DEC. at 1114. 
63. See notes 65-66, 90-91 and accompanying text infra. 
64. See 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 51, 9 9 47.01-.38. 
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the word "person" as used in section 113 of the statute is defined 
in section 302(e) to include  state^."'^ Basing its argument on the 
presumption that the meaning of words as defined in the defini- 
tion section ~ontrols, '~ the EPA argues that states are subject to 
the enforcement provisions of section 113. 
The difficulty with definitions, however, is that definitions 
are also written in words that must be defined. Although each of 
the circuits acknowledged the binding effect of the definition of 
"person" in section 302(e)," they disagreed on what Congress 
meant by the word "States" in the definition. The Third Circuit 
in Pennsylvania v. EPA held that " Congress did contemplate" 
the possibility that the definition section used in connection with 
section 113 could be used to force states to implement transporta- 
tion control plans.ss The Ninth Circuit in Brown v. EPA and the 
D.C. Circuit in District of Columbia v. Train, however, distin- 
guished a state that pollutes and a state that chooses not to 
control pollution caused by the general public. Only the former, 
concluded both circuits, was intended by Congress to be included 
in the meaning of "State."69 
In support of their interpretation, the Ninth and D.C. Cir- 
cuits drew several inferences from the text of the statute. Both 
circuits held that the notice provisions in section 113(a)(1)70 re- 
quiring the EPA to notify both the "person" in violation of the 
plan and the "State" in which the plan applies distinguish "per- 
son" from "state" and clearly indicate that they are two distinct 
entities." The Ninth Circuit refused to invalidate this distinction 
by reading into section 113 the statutory definition of "person," 
stating that "the Administrator had no difficulty in making clear 
his intention to impose sanctions on states not enforcing effec- 
tively implementation plans. Congress can be expected to have 
65. Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d a t  256-57; 38 Fed. Reg. 30,632-33 (1973). 
66. See generally Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947); Packard 
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947). 
It is also asserted that a statutory definition that declares what a term "includes" 
rather than what a term "means" is more susceptible to an extension of meaning. 2A 
SUTHERLAND, supra note 51, § 47.07, a t  82. The definition of "person" in § 302(e) declares 
what the term "includes" and is, therefore, even more favorable to  the EPA interpretation. 
67. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d a t  983. 
68. 500 F.2d a t  257. 
69. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d a t  983; Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d at  832. 
This distinction is consistent with modem legislative efforts to  invalidate the notion of 
sovereign immunity by including "states" in the definition of "persons." 3 J. SUTHERLAND, 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION $ 62.03 (4th ed. 1974). 
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(l) (1970). For the text of this section see note 45 supra. 
71. District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d a t  985; Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d at  834. 
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no less capacity for ~larity."'~ The D.C. Circuit found that two 
notices would not have been required if Congress had expected 
the states to enact and enforce applicable transportation control 
plans. According to the court, "[tlhe most 'efficient' enforce- 
ment from the standpoint of commitment of federal resources 
would be to order the state to take action against the violator and 
proceed against state officials under section 113(b) or (c) if they 
fail to act."73 
The D.C. Circuit went on to draw a number of additional 
inferences from the statutory text in support of its interpretation. 
First, the court distinguished the phrases "violations of an applic- 
able implementation plan" and "a failure of the State in which 
the plan applies to enforce the plan effectively," both of which 
are found in section ll3(a) (2).74 The court stated that: 
Since widespread violations "result from" a state's failure to 
enforce a plan, the language strongly suggests Congress did not 
believe that inadequate state enforcement was, by itself, a "vio- 
lation." Rather, the term "violation" must logically refer to the 
emission of pollutants into the air contrary to the provisions of 
an applicable implementation plan .75 
The court also found the procedures to be followed by the EPA 
in commencing "the period of federally assumed enforcement" 
referred'to in section 113(a)(2) to be inconsistent with the EPA's 
broad interpretation of its own powers.76 
Second, as to section l10(a)(l),77 the D.C. Circuit character- 
ized the language "[elach state shall . . . submit . . . a plan" 
as directory rather than mandatory, which negated the EPA's 
position that Congress intended to allow the EPA to force states 
to implement plans." The court's conclusion on this point is con- 
trary, however, to two presumptions which favor construing this 
section as mandatory. First, the word "shall" is ordinarily pre- 
sumed to be used in the imperative rather than the directory 
72. 521 F.2d at  834. 
73. 521 F.2d at  985. 
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8(a)(2) (1970). For the text of this section see note 45 supra. 
75. 521 F.2d at  985-86. 
76. Id. at  986. The court gave two reasons for this conclusion: first, the dual notice 
provisions of § 113 indicate a congressional intent that enforcement provisions during the 
"period of federally assumed enforcement" should be used against polluters only and not 
the states; second, the provision for terminating the federal enforcement period is volun- 
tary and therefore not required of the states. Id. 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(l) (1970). For the text of this section see note 32 supra. 
78. 521 F.2d at  986. 
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sense.79 Second, a mandatory construction is generally favored 
unless a statute's directory character clearly appears." Neither of 
these presumptions, however, is conclusive. One well-defined ex- 
ception, described in a subsequent section of this comment, spec- 
ifies that a statute should be given a directory meaning where an 
imperative construction might involve an unconstitutional dele- 
gation of power.R' The D.C. Circuit, however, did not expressly 
rely on this exception. Instead, the court found it significant that 
Congress did not provide in section 110 any means of directly 
forcing the states to comply.R2 It appears that the court employed 
a "stated consequences" exception; that is, where the conse- 
quences or punishment imposed for violating a particular provi- 
sion of an act are not exclusive and preemptory, the provision is 
generally regarded as d i r e c t ~ r y . ~ ~  The D.C. Circuit found that the 
terms of section 110 are not exclusive since the EPA is expressly 
required to prepare, in whole or in part, plans for states that fail 
to comply. This indicated to the court that Congress did not feel 
that state-adopted regulations were necessary to achieve the goal 
of the 1970 amendments. The court stated: "On the contrary, 
section 110(c) specifically contemplates that some states would 
fail to live up to their 'responsibility.' 
In contrast to the Ninth and D.C. Circuits' careful scrutiny 
of the statutory text, the Third Circuit did not draw any inference 
except that associated with the statutory definition of "person. " 
One explanation for the Third Circuit's brevity in this area may 
be that the court did not feel obligated to go beyond the defini- 
tional presumption already in its fav~r .~Vndeed,  although the 
79. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 51, § 57.03. 
80. Id. 4 57.01, a t  413. 
81. See notes 109-111 and accompanying text infra. 
82. 521 F.2d a t  986. 
83. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 51, 4 57.08, a t  423, quoting Tuthill v. Rendeleman, 
387 Ill. 321, 350, 56 N.E.2d 375, 390 (1944). 
84. 521 F.2d at  984. The Fourth Circuit in Maryland o. EPA may have been influ- 
enced by a similar argument raised by the Maryland brief, even though there is no 
mention of the argument in the text of the  opinion. Although the Third Circuit in 
Pennsylvania v. EPA had concluded that the 1970 amendments indicated an "underlying 
assumption" that states could be required to implement transportation control plans, 
Maryland argued: "On the contrary, Sections 110(c) and 113(a)(2) clearly indicate an 
assumption that they (the states) could not be required to do so . . . If it were true that 
the States could be required to implement a Plan, then these provisions for direct federal 
action would be superfluous." Brief for Petitioner a t  26, Maryland v. EPA, 8 ENVIH. REP. 
DEC. 1105 (4th Cir. 1975). 
85. Generally such a presumption is overcome only if the statutory definition creates 
obvious incongruities in the statute, or where one of the major purposes of the statute is 
destroyed by obedience to the statutory definition. See generally 1A J .  SUTHEHI~AND, STAT- 
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Ninth Circuit relied on inferences drawn from the statutory text, 
its opinion suggests that these inferences by themselves would 
probably not have been sufficient to overcome the presumption 
of validity in favor of the definitional section. The court based its 
rejection of the presumption "primarily" on constitutional 
grounds, stating that "Congress would not have intended to take 
such a step in the light of the delicacy with which federal-state 
relations always have been treated . . . The efficacy of using 
constitutional considerations as a basis of statutory construction 
is discussed in a subsequent section.87 
D. Extrinsic Aids of Interpretation - Legislative History 
Despite historical limitations, a federal court may now con- 
sider legislative history in construing a statute even when the 
words, taken alone, have an unambiguous meaning." Character- 
istic of this trend is the Third Circuit opinion in Pennsylvania v. 
E P A  which supported its definitional argument with certain 
statements selected from the voluminous history of the 1970 
a r n e n d m e n t ~ . ~ ~  In particular, the court held that certain state- 
ments clearly show Congress' intention that the states would be 
required to cooperate in "inspection and maintenance" programs 
for all state registered automobiles.g0 Because the states were re- 
quired to cooperate in these kinds of programs, the court inferred 
a clear legislative expectation that the states should implement 
other portions of their transportation control plans, and could, in 
fact, be required to do 
The specific statements relied on by the Third Circuit are 
important, although the Third Circuit may have overemphasized 
UTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 20.08 (4th ed. 1972). To the Third Circuit, obedience 
to the statutory definition apparently caused none of these problems. 
86. 521 F.2d at  834. 
87. Notes 109-112 and accompanying text infra. 
88. See, e.g., United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534,543-44 (1940); 
United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554, 561-62 (1940). 
89. For an excellent discussion of the legislative history of the 1970 amendments see 
Kramer, supra note 21, a t  49-67. 
90. 500 F.2d at  258. "[Tlhe implementation plan section of the proposed bill would 
specifically provide that,  to the extent necessary, each region develop motor vehicle 
inspection and testing programs . . . ." S. REP. NO. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1970) 
(emphasis added); "[Tlhese standards must be put into effect by the communities and 
the states, and we expect them to have the men to do the actual enforcing." 116 CONG. 
REC. 19,204 (1970) (remarks of Representative Staggers). "[TI he legislation provides that 
States must require inspection of motor vehicles in actual use . . . ." H.R. REP. NO. 1146, 
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970) (emphasis added). 
91. 500 F.2d a t  258. 
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them. Indeed, excessive reliance on a few short statements ex- 
tracted from a copious legislative history, no less than the literal- 
ism of the plain meaning rule, may lead to a distorted view of the 
statutory purpose since less thought is spent on the future impli- 
cations of a committee report or explanation on the floor than on 
the selection of the words of a statute.92 In this respect, the brief 
submitted to the Ninth Circuit by California identifies some of 
the limitations of the statements relied on by the Third Circuit. 
According to the state, none of the quotations cited by the Third 
Circuit mention the possibility of federal sanctions being imposed 
on states that fail to enforce applicable implementation plans. 
Furthermore, the quotations all appear to have been taken from 
discussions of what a state must do in order to have an acceptable 
plan rather than from discussions of what power the EPA has to 
force states to act.93 
Whatever the merits of the specific quotations, they were of 
enough significance to induce responses from the Ninth Circuit 
in Brown v. EPA and the D.C. Circuit in District of Columbia v. 
Train. It is not surprising, in light of the Ninth Circuit's express 
desire to avoid confronting serious constitutional issues, that the 
court, by finding the entire legislative history ambiguous and 
therefore of no value to any in te rp re ta t i~n ,~~  rejected the Third 
Circuit's quotations from the legislative history. The D.C. Cir- 
cuit, on the other hand, accepted the Third Circuit's reasoning, 
but only to the extent of the maintenance and inspection pro- 
grams expressly referred to in the quotations. As to these pro- 
grams, the court found that the Act neither specifically rejects the 
Administrator's claim of power nor expressly supports it." Find- 
ing this ambiguity in the Act, the court accepted the quotations 
from the legislative history and upheld the EPA's interpretation, 
subject to constitutional c~nsiderations.~" 
92. Cf.  Wasby, Legislative Materials as an Aid to Statutory Interpretation: A C a ~ ~ e a t ,  
12 J. PUB. L. 262 (1963). 
93. Reply Brief for Petitioner a t  16-17, Brown V. .EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975). 
94. 521 F.2d at 835-36. Where a court determines the applicable legislative history 
of an act to be ambiguous, the general rule is that the legislative history should be ignored 
in favor of a n  application of the clear and precise statutory language and purpose. Citizens 
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412 (1971); Greenwood v. United 
States, 350 U.S. 366, 374 (1956). Although the Ninth Circuit looked to the language of 
the statute, it is clear that its interpretation was primarily motivated by deference to 
constitutional concerns. See notes 109-112 and accompanying text infra. 
95. 521 F.2d at 988. 
96. See notes 174-182 and accompanying text infra. 
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E. Extrinsic Aids of Interpretation - Deference to 
Administrator 
As in the instant case, i t  often happens that before a federal 
statute is brought to the courts for interpretation, the agency 
charged with its administration has already promulgated in- 
terpretive regulations. The question then becomes: To what ex- 
tent, if a t  all, should the administrative agency's determination 
of the meaning of the act be taken into account by the reviewing 
court? This question received varied treatment from the different 
circuits. 
The general rule, as identified by the Third, Fourth, and 
D.C. Circuits, is that the construction of a statute by an adminis- 
trative agency charged with supervision of the statute is entitled 
to "great deferenceMg7 because the specialized experience and 
breadth of information available to administrative officials give 
them greater opportunities for accurately determining the con- 
gressional intention than are afforded to the courts, especially as 
concerns the making of interstitial law.gR The Third Circuit in 
Pennsylvania v .  EPA gave great deference to the EPA's interpre- 
tation, for example, because "it represents the judgment of one 
charged with carrying out the statutory provisions 'while they are 
yet untried and new' . . . . 9999 
Such great deference is significant in that it limits the other- 
wise broad scope of judicial review.'"" This is clear from the four 
opinions construing the 1970 amendments. In holding that the 
EPA's interpretation was entitled to great weight, the Third Cir- 
cuit set up a "compelling evidence" standard; that is, the court 
refused to prohibit any agency action imperative to the success 
of the Act "in the absence of compelling evidence that such 
[prohibition] was Congress' intention."'" Since the court did not 
find any compelling evidence that Congress did not intend to 
make states subject to enforcement procedures for failure to im- 
plement plans, the court upheld the EPA interpretation. The 
Ninth, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits avoided the narrow confines of 
the compelling evidence standard. Although the Ninth and D.C. 
97. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). 
98. Cf. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139 (1944). 
99. 500 F.2d at 257, quoting Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 
U.S. 294, 315 (1933). 
100. Cf. 4 K.  DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE fI fI 28.01-29.11 (1958). 
101. 500 F.2d at 258 (citations omitted). In reaching this conclusion, the Third Cir- 
cuit apparently accepted the EPA's factual determination that state action is imperative 
to the success of the clean air legislation. 38 Fed. Reg. 30,632-33 (1973). 
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Circuits were mute on the entire issue, the Fourth Circuit refused 
to give great weight to the EPA's interpretation on the broad 
ground that it was not in accordance with law.'"* 
The refusal of the Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits to give 
great weight to the EPA's interpretation may be explained by 
exceptions to the general rule. First, it is clear that the courts 
remain the final authorities on issues of statutory construction, 
and "are not obliged to stand aside and rubberstamp their affirm- 
ance of administrative decisions that they deem inconsistent with 
a statutory mandate or that frustrate the congressional policy 
underlying a statute."lo3 Besides being subject to the general limi- 
tations of the Administrative Procedure Act,'04 agency decisions 
are often limited by a rule restricting an agency from deciding the 
limits of its own statutory powers . ' "~l though not expressly 
stated by any of the courts, the EPA interpretation of the 1970 
amendments is arguably in this category of decisionmaking. 
F. Conclusion - Policy Considerations 
Courts have traditionally favored statutory construction that 
is consistent with public p ~ l i c y . ~ " T h e  Third Circuit in 
Pennsylvania v .  EPA accurately pointed out that Congress in- 
tended "sweeping changes" in the antipollution laws when it en- 
acted the 1970 amendments.'" Emphasis on these sweeping 
changes plus the seriousness of the pollution problem in the cities 
and states induced the court to liberally read the Act so as to 
better effectuate the manifested purpose. The Ninth, Fourth, and 
D.C. Circuits, on the other hand, strictly construed the 1970 
amendments against the EPA's interpretation without mention 
of any intended sweeping changes. Although each court pur- 
ported to base its decision on the various criteria of statutory 
construction previously discussed, it is clear that constitutional 
considerations were of primary importance to a t  least the Ninth 
102. 8 ENVIH. REP. DEC. at 1114, citing 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). 
103. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U S .  278, 291 (1965). 
104. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970). 
105. See Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U S .  358, 369 (1946). As to this rule, 
one court stated: 
[T]he fact that the rule is a good rule and has the effect claimed for it, does 
not validate an unlawful rule. As the board did not have the power to make the 
rule, the fact that it might be beneficial is immaterial. 
Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins, 88 Cal. App. 2d 438, 199 P.2d 34, 42 (1948). 
106. See generally 2A SUTHERLAND, supra note 51, 8 4  56.01-.05. 
107. 500 F.2d a t  257. 
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Circuit in Brown v. EPA and the Fourth Circuit in Maryland v. 
EPA. To both circuits a finding in favor of the EPA's interpreta- 
tion of the statutory authority issue would have required invali- 
dation of the 1970 arnendment~.~"~ 
A corollary to the rule that courts should avoid constitutional 
questions if at all possible is the rule that if one among alternate 
constructions involves serious constitutional difficulties, then the 
construction not constitutionally infirm should be adopted.10Y 
This rule of statutory construction is illustrated by a recent group 
of United States Supreme Court cases dealing with federal crimi- 
nal l e g i ~ l a t i o n . ~ ~ ~  In these cases, federal prosecutors urged the 
Court to broadly construe certain federal statutes so as to permit 
federal criminal jurisdiction in areas of traditionally local gover- 
nance. The Supreme Court avoided the constitutional issues aris- 
ing under the commerce clause, however, by restricting the scope 
of the subject legislation. In one of the cases, Justice Marshall 
explained the rationale for narrowly construing the legislation: 
[Ulnless Congress conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be 
deemed to have significantly changed the federal-state balance. 
Congress has traditionally been reluctant to define as a federal 
crime conduct readily denounced as  criminal by the  
States. . . . [W]e will not be quick to assume that Congress 
has meant to effect a signficant change in the sensitive relation 
between federal and state criminal jurisdiction. In traditionally 
sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, 
the requirement of clear statement assures that the legislature 
has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical 
matters involved in the judicial 
The sovereign balance in federal-state relations is also in- 
volved in interpreting the 1970 amendments and, therefore, an 
equally clear congressional statement should be present before 
legislation is construed so as to alter this balance. I t  appears that 
the Ninth Circuit in Brown v. EPA was looking for such a clear 
statement when it stated: 
Congress would not have intended to take such a step in the 
108. See, e.g., Maryland v. EPA, 8 ENVIR. REP. DEC. a t  1113. 
109. Blasecki v. City of Durham, 456 F.2d 87, 93 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. 
Thompson, 452 F.2d 1333, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Application of the United States, 427 
F.2d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 1970). 
110. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 
336 (1971); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971); United States v. Five Gambling 
Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953). 
111. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971) (footnote omitted). 
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light of the delicacy with which federal-state relations always 
have been treated by all branches of the Federal go~ernrnent."~ 
Indeed, the interpretations of the Ninth, Fourth, and D.C. Cir- 
cuits correctly embrace the Supreme Court's reasoning since nei- 
ther the statute nor the legislative history contain a clear state- 
ment that the federal-state balance should be altered to allow 
federal control of state legislative and administrative processes. 
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The EPA Administrator in each of the cases claimed that the 
commerce clause provided authority for his actions.ltR The states 
conceded that the commerce clause, as expansively interpreted 
by past Supreme Court decisions, 114 does give the Administrator 
- -- - - - - -- 
112. 521 F.2d a t  834. 
113. For the Administrator's position see 38 Fed. Reg. 30,632-33 (1973). The com- 
merce power has been the basis for a substantial amount of comprehensive federal legisla- 
tion, the constitutionality of which has been upheld by the Supreme Court. See, e .g . ,  Swift 
& Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. $ 4  1-7 
(1970)); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (National Labor Rela- 
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. $ 8  151-66 (1970)); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (Fair 
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. $ 8  201 et seq. (1970)); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 
(1942) (Agriculture Adjustment Act, 52 Stat. 31, as amended, 7 U.S.C. # #  1281 et seq. 
(1970)); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (Civil Rights Act of 1964,28 U.S.C. 
Q 1447, 42 U.S.C. $ 4  1971, 1975a-d, 2000a to h-6 (1970)). 
114. There is little doubt, as conceded by the states, that the art. I, ji 8 grant to 
Congress of the power to regulate commerce is broad. Judicial decisions construing the 
commerce power most expansively have relied primarily on Chief Justice Marshall's opin- 
ion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), the first case to deal with the scope 
of the commerce clause. Chief Justice Marshall's oft-quoted language is: "This power, like 
all others vested in Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, 
and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution." Id. at  
196. Qualified only by the statement that the commerce clause does not give Congress 
power over completely internal concerns of individual states, this broad view of the com- 
merce power, plus Chief Justice Marshall's expansive interpretation of the necessary and 
proper clause has made the commerce power a potent tool of congressional regulation. 
Chief Justice Marshall made the following statement concerning the necessary and proper 
clause: 
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all 
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are 
not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional. 
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). 
The case most often cited for the liberal judicial extension of the commerce power is 
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), wherein the Court held that the commerce power 
extended to regulate the price of a small farmer's crops which were to be used wholly for 
his own consumption. The case was particularly significant because of its promulgation 
of the "aggregate affect" concept. Simply put, the Court found that although the farmer 
involved in the particular case grew crops strictly for his own consumption, the "aggregate 
affect" of the local activities of all those similarly situated did have the requisite "substnn- 
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broad regulatory powers.11g Clearly, pollution affects interstate 
commerce and therefore the Administrator has the right to pro- 
mulgate pollution control plans and enforce them against individ- 
ual polluters, including states. Nevertheless, the states argued 
that the Tenth Amendment implicitly prevents the Administra- 
tor from compelling the states to exercise their legislative and 
administrative powers to administer the federal plan.I1Vn ad- 
dressing the states' contention, the circuit courts were faced with 
two questions: (1) Does the Tenth Amendment limit the federal 
government's intrusion, pursuant to the commerce power, into 
traditional state affairs?"' (2) If it does, what is the scope of the 
Tenth Amendment's limitations on the federal government? 
A. Nature of the Problem 
The necessity for a constitutional limitation arose after Chief 
Justice Marshall described the commerce power as "complete in 
itself" and "acknowledg[ing] no limitations, other than are pre- 
scribed in the C o n s t i t u t i ~ n . " ~ ~ ~  As the federal government began 
to regulate state activities pursuant to its commerce power, the 
states sought for the constitutional prescription spoken of by 
Marshall. In spite of its unfortunate wording, the Tenth Amend- 
ment was the states' best constitutional argument: "The powers 
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro- 
hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people."11s 
tial affect" on interstate commerce. Id. a t  128-29. See Polish Nat'l Alliance of the United 
States v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648 (1944). 
The modern view of the expansive reach of the commerce power apparently was not 
foreseen by Madison when he said: "The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power; 
but that seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are 
entertained." THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, a t  329 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison). For a 
further explanation of Madison's views see notes 234-237 and accompanying text infra.  
115. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d a t  259. 
116. See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d a t  838. 
117. Professor Charles C. Black's interpretation of judicial decisions up to 1970 lead 
him to the following conclusion about the existence of an implied constitutional limit to 
federal powers: 
Here is one of the most important questions conceivable with respect to the 
legal basis of federalism. Is there an implied limitation on the federal powers, 
to the effect they shall not be used to deal with some matters under state 
authority? The prevalent modern answer is negative. 
C. BLACK, PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 25 (1970). Cf. Strong, Cooperative 
Federalism, 23 IOWA L. REV. 459, 474 (1938). 
118. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824). 
119. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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Until the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. 
Darby,120 states argued that the Tenth Amendment explicitly lim- 
its congressional exercise of the commerce power.'21 In Darby, 
however, the Court dismissed this argument, reasoning that 
"[tlhe amendment states but a truism that all is retained which 
has not been surrendered. "lZ2 
In spite of the decision in Darby, states have argued that the 
Tenth Amendment is evidence of an implicit constitutional limit 
to the commerce power; that the amendment, by recognizing the 
essential role of the states in the federal system, implicitly pro- 
hibits federal action which unduly impairs the ability of the 
states to effectively function as sovereign units in that system. To 
date, the Supreme Court has not clearly explained whether there 
is such an implicit constitutional limit to the commerce power.I2" 
Even if the judiciary does recognize the existence of a Tenth 
Amendment limit to the commerce power, the courts still face the 
difficult task of defining the scope of that limit. In past cases, 
states have sought to define the scope by claiming immunity from 
congressional regulation pursuant to the commerce power for 
"governmental, " "essential governmental, " and "sovereign" 
functions, but each of these formulations of the limit to the com- 
merce power has been disapproved by the Supreme Court.I2.' 
B. Past Supreme Court Decisions 
The circuit courts' analysis of the constitutional issues fo- 
120. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
121. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 106 (1941); Kansas v. Colorado, 
206 U.S. 46, 90-91 (1906). 
122. 312 U.S. a t  124. The Third Circuit apparently felt that this language in Darby 
negated any constitutional argument based on the Tenth Amendment as a limit to federal 
powers. See notes 144-148 and accompanying text infra. 
123. The importance of this inquiry was recognized by the district court in Maryland 
v. Wirtz, 269 F. Supp. 826, 849 (D. Md. 1967), aff 'd, 392 U.S. 183 (1968): "If the concept 
of federalism is to survive, it must stand on constitutional limitations, not on the suffer- 
ance of the federal government." But see Wechsler, Political Safeguards of Fed~ralism: 
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Gouerment, 54 
COLUM. L. REV. 543, 544 (1954): 
National action has always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an 
intrusion to be justified by some necessity, the special rather than the ordinary 
case. This point of view cuts even deeper than the concept of the central govern- 
ment as one of granted, limited authority, articulated in the Tenth Amendment. 
124. The "governmental" argument was rejected in New York v. United States, 326 
U.S. 572, 583 (1945). The "essential" state function argument was rejected in Case v. 
Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 101 (1946). The "sovereignty" argument was rejected by United 
States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183-85 (1936). For a discussion of these various formula- 
tions and their ultimate disposition see 66 MICH. L. REV. 750, 770-71 (1968). 
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cused primarily on past Supreme Court cases which held that 
federal statutes regulating the activities of private parties could 
constitutionally be extended to similar state activities. The Ad- 
ministrator's interpretation of the Clean Air Act amendments 
would, unlike the federal regulation dealt with in these Supreme 
Court cases, require each state to use its resources in administer- 
ing a federally promulgated regulatory scheme. A major consider- 
ation to each circuit court, then, was the significance of this fac- 
tual difference. 
1. Supreme Court statements appear to recognize no limits to 
the commerce power 
The first cases dealing with the proper accommodation of 
states' rights in the federal system arose when the federal govern- 
ment began to tax various state activities. In confronting the 
federalism issue, the Supreme Court recognized that states do 
have some protection against the federal taxing power.12s Early 
cases held that the states were immune from taxation by the 
federal government when acting in their governmental capacity, 
but not immune when engaged in proprietary a~t iv i t ies .~*Vhen 
state governments sought this same immunity from the com- 
merce power, however, the judiciary was not persuaded. In 
United States v. C a l i f ~ r n i a , ~ ~ ~  relied upon by the Administrator, 
Congress sought to bring a state-owned railroad within the scope 
of the Safety Appliance Act passed under the aegis of the com- 
merce clause. The states argued that operation of the railroad was 
a governmental function and therefore immune from federal regu- 
lation. Addressing this argument, the Court said: 
[W]e think it unimportant to say whether the state conducts 
its railroad in its "sovereign" or in its "private" capacity. That 
in operating its railroad it is acting within a power reserved to 
the states cannot be doubted. . . . [But] [tlhe sovereign 
power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent of 
grants of power to the federal government in the Constituti~n.'~~ 
125. The source of the federal taxing power is U.S. CONST. art. I, $ 8, cl. 1: "The 
Congress shall have Power to Lay and collect Taxes . . . ." 
126. See, e.g., Allen v. Regents, 304 U S .  439,451-53 (1938); Helvering v. Powers, 293 
U.S. 214, 227 (1934); Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 360,369 (1934); South Carolina v. United 
States, 199 U.S. 437, 447 (1905). 
127. 297 U.S. 175 (1936). 
128. Id. at 183-84. One commentator believes that the result in United States u.  
California, although justifiable when decided in 1936, is no longer applicable for two 
reasons: (1) the Supreme Court did not perceive the dangerous destructive potential of 
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This language in United States v. California influenced the 
Court in Maryland u.  W i r t ~ . l ~ ~  Wirtz arose when Congress 
amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to apply to the operation 
of state-owned hospitals and schools. Maryland argued that this 
action was not permissible under the commerce clause because 
the commerce power could not be used to interfere with govern- 
mental functions. The Court found this argument untenable, rea- 
soning that state concerns cannot " 'outweigh' the importance of 
an otherwise valid federal statute regulating c~mmerce."'~Witing 
United States v. California, the Court in Wirtz concluded that 
"[ilf a State is engaging in economic activities that are validly 
regulated by the Federal Government when engaged in by private 
persons, the State too may be forced to conform its activities to 
federal regulation. "I3' 
Because of the broad language in United States u. California 
cited with approval in Maryland v. Wirtz, it is possible to con- 
clude that no constitutional limit, express or implied, constrains 
congressional exercise of the commerce power. Only language in 
Fry v. United States,132 the most recent Supreme Court case deal- 
ing with the constitutional issues here involved, specifically refers 
to a constitutional limitation to the commerce power.'" In dic- 
tum, the Court in Fry refers to the Tenth Amendment as declar- 
- -- 
the commerce power, and (2) the tax immunity doctrine "hinged on the muddled distinc- 
tion between 'governmental' and 'proprietary' activities." 53 TEXAS L. REV. 380, 383-84 
(1975). See also Fry v. United States, 421 U S .  542, 553-56 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,  dissent- 
ing). 
129. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). In Maryland v. Wirtz, the Fair Labor Standards Act was 
extended to state-owned schools and hospitals. The Court, however, made it clear that 
the intrusion into state medical and educational functions was minimal: 
Thus appellants' characterization of the question in this case as whether Con- 
gress may, under the guise of the commerce power, tell the states how to perform 
medical and educational functions is not factually accurate. Congress has "in- 
terfered with" these state functions only to the extent of providing that when a 
State employs people in performing such functions i t  is subject to the same 
restrictions as a wide range of other employers whose activities affect commerce, 
including privately operated schools and hospitals, 
Id. a t  133-94. 
130. Id. a t  195-96. 
131. Id. a t  197. 
132. 421 U.S. 542 (1975). In Fry, the Court upheld the application of the Economic 
Stabilization Act of 1970 to the state's employees. 
133. The Court in Maryland v. Wirtz said "[tlhe Court has ample power to prevent 
what the appellants purport to fear, 'the utter destruction of the state as a sovereign 
political entity.' " 392 U.S. at  196. The Court, however, does not cite any authority for 
this proposition, nor state whether the Court's power is derived from the Constitution. For 
the circuit courts' discussion of the quoted language see notes 155-161 and accompanying 
text infra. 
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ing "the 
power in 
ity to fur 
constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise 
a fashion that impairs the states' integrity or their abil- 
wtion effectively in a federal system."'34 
In summary, then, only one of the Supreme Court cases in- 
volving constitutional issues present here has mentioned a consti- 
tutional limit to the federal commerce power, the authority by 
which the Administrator of the EPA sought to regulate the states' 
activities. lS5 
2. T h e  Fourth and Nin th  Circuits distinguish the cases 
In spite of the holdings in the previously discussed Supreme 
Court cases, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits determined that those 
cases are consistent with the concept of a limitation to the com- 
merce power. Essentially, the courts reasoned that the decisions 
in United States v. California and Maryland v. Wirtz only apply 
when the state activities subject to federal regulation are similar 
to those carried on by private parties.136 For example, the Ninth 
Circuit in Brown cites Justice Harlan's statement in Wirtz that 
"the Court has ample power to prevent . . . the utter destruction 
of the state as a sovereign political entity" as recognizing this 
distinction. 13' 
Indeed, the Court in Wirtz did qualify the language in United 
134. 421 U.S. a t  547 n.7. The Court prefaced the quoted language dealing with the 
Tenth Amendment by this statement: 
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a "truism," stating 
merely that "all is retained which has not been surrendered," . . . it is not 
without significance. 
Id. 
In addition to the dictum in Fry v. United States, individual justices of the Supreme 
Court have recognized the existence of a constitutional limit to the federal commerce 
power. Justice Douglas said: "But what is done here is nonetheless such a serious invasion 
of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that it is in my view not consis- 
tent with our constitutional federalism." Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 201 (1968) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Fry v. United States, criticized the following broad 
language in United States u. California: "The state can no more deny the power if its 
exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an individual," 297 U.S. at 185. 
According to Justice Rehnquist, "[sluch an answer is simply a denial of the inherent 
affirmative constitutional limitation on congressional power which I believe the States 
possess." 421 U.S. a t  553. 
135. In spite of the fact that the statement in Fry was only dictum contained in a 
footnote to the Court's opinion, the case appears to have had a significant impact on the 
circuit courts' holdings. The only decision to completely reject a state's constitutional 
argument, the Third Circuit's opinion in Pennsylvania v. EPA, was decided prior to Fry, 
while the other three cases were decided subsequently. 
136. See note 233 infra. 
137. 521 F.2d at  839. 
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States v. California by interpreting the case as standing for the 
proposition that "if a State is engaging in economic activities that  
are validly regulated by the Federal Government when engaged 
i n  by private persons, the State too may be forced to conform its 
activities to federal reg~la t ion." '~~ In addition, in Parden v. Ter- 
minal Railway,139 the Court reiterated the principle announced in 
United States v. California, but limited the effect of that lan- 
guage by concluding that "when a state leaves the sphere that is 
exclusively its own, and enters into activities subject to congres- 
sional regulation, it subjects itself to that regulation as fully as if 
it were a private person or corporation."14o 
Although the Court in United States v. California and 
Parden u. Terminal Railway spoke in absolute terms of sovereign 
powers being diminished, it is evident from the Court's conclu- 
sion in the latter case that the federal government may regulate 
only activities that are not exclusively a state's own. While this 
conclusion does not obviously follow from the broad principles 
announced in United States v. California and Maryland v. Wirtz,  
i t  is consistent with the holdings in those casest41 and does provide 
a logical explanation for the Court's continued references to lim- 
its on the commerce power. 
C. The  Circuits' Analysis of the Constitutional Issues 
The states' main constitutional argument was that the Tenth 
Amendment evidences an implicit constitutional limit to the fed- 
eral commerce power which the Administrator has exceeded. The 
response of the circuits to this argument is a major point of differ- 
ence in their opinions. 
1. The  Third Circuit rejects Pennsylvania's constitutional 
argument 
Because past Supreme Court decisions have cast substantial 
doubt on the existence of a constitutional limit to the commerce 
power,142 i t  is not surprising that Pennsylvania did not even argue 
138. 392 U.S. at 197 (emphasis added). 
139. 377 U.S. 184 (1964). In Parden, the Court agreed to extend the Federal Em- 
ployer's Liability Act (FELA) to the states. Cf. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & 
Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). 
140. 377 U.S. at 196 (emphasis added). 
141. Both the ownership and operation of the railroad in United States o. California 
and the ownership and operation of schools and hospitals in Maryland u. Wirtz are activi- 
ties engaged in by both public and private entities. See note 167 infra. 
142. See notes 120-122, 127-134 and accompanying text supra. 
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that the Tenth Amendment limits federal exercise of the com- 
merce power.'" Despite this omission, the court in Pennsylvania 
v. EPA dealt with the Tenth Amendment issue,i44 quoting the 
1946 Supreme Court case of Case v. Bo~les '~Qs  dismissing any 
constitutional argument based on the amendment: "[Tlhe 
Tenth Amendment does not operate as a limitation upon the 
powers, express or implied,14"elegated to the national govern- 
ment."14' The Court in Case v. Bowles derived this principle from 
United States v. D a r b ~ . " ~  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's recent reference in Fry to 
the important constitutional role of the Tenth Amendment illus- 
trates the error in the Third Circuit's reasoning that Darby and 
Case v. Bowles negated the amendment's significance. In appar- 
ent reference to Darby, the Court in Fry stated that: 
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a 
"truism" . . . i t  is not without significance. The Amendment 
expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress may 
not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity 
or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.t49 
The Court's use of the word "expressly" is clearly not an attempt 
to overrule Darby, which rejected the argument that the Tenth 
Amendment expressly limits the federal commerce power. The 
Court in Fry reasoned that the amendment's significance is in 
143. While it is understandable that Pennsylvania would not base its constitutional 
argument on the Tenth Amendment, it may have been a tactical error not to do so. Had 
the state conceded that the literal wording of the Tenth Amendment does not limit the 
commerce power, yet argued that the amendment does implicitly limit federal powers, the 
Third Circuit could not have dismissed the state's constitutional argument by simple 
reference to Case u. Bowles. See notes 142-150 and accompanying text infra. 
144. 500 F.2d at  259 n.20. 
145. 327 U.S. 92 (1946). 
146. I t  is important to note that the Court's reference here to "powers express or 
implied" is not relevant to the issue of whether the Tenth Amendment acts as an "express 
or implied" limitation to the commerce power. When the Court says that the Tenth 
Amendment does not limit express or implied powers delegated to the federal government, 
it is referring to the origin of the federal power sought to be limited, in this case the federal 
commerce power, which is an express power delegated to the federal government. 
147. 327 U.S. a t  102. The Court quotes Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340,362 (1945), 
which cites United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. a t  123-24, for the proposition. 
148. Confusion as to the meaning of the Tenth Amendment has arisen because of the 
Llarby Court's reference to the Tenth Amendment as a "truism." 312 U.S. a t  124. In that 
case, however, the Court merely rejected the appellee's argument that "the Tenth Amend- 
ment expressly stipulates that certain powers are reserved to the people." Id. at 106. 
Therefore, since Darby it has generally been considered futile to argue that the literal 
wording of the Tenth Amendment limits the commerce power. 
149. Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975). 
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expressly declaring constitutional policy. This policy of protect- 
ing the states' integrity is not explicitly contained in the Consti- 
tution but is implicitly derived from the Constitution's establish- 
ment of a federal system with independent states. The Tenth 
Amendment "expressly" recognizes this concept of separate state 
existence by reference to powers reserved to the states.15o 
Not only did the court in Pennsylvania u. EPA dispose of any 
possible argument based on the Tenth Amendment, but the court 
also rejected the state's argument that the Administrator's inter- 
pretation of the Act would "pose an unconstitutional threat to the 
sovereignty of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania."'~ In an ap- 
parent belief that the Tenth Amendment was not a viable argu- 
ment, the state cited no provision of the Constitution to support 
its contention but instead relied on past Supreme Court cases 
dealing with limits to the federal taxing power. The circuit court 
in Pennsylvania v. EPA acknowledged that the Supreme Court 
has upheld a state sovereignty argument in cases dealing with the 
scope of the federal taxing power but rejected Pennsylvania's 
sovereign state function argument,'" primarily by its interpreta- 
tion of Maryland v. Wirtz, which it claimed rejected a similar 
a rg~rnen t?~  The Third Circuit broadly interpreted the case as 
standing for the "principle that the constitutionality of federal 
regulation of state activities is subject to the same analysis as 
that of private activities; viz. the determinative factor is simply 
150. California, apparently influenced by Fry, conceded the point made in Darby, 
but argued that the purpose of the Tenth Amendment supports its argument: "While the 
Tenth Amendment did not establish a new constitutional principle, its clear purpose was 
to solidify the position of state governments as sovereign within their sphere." Brief for 
Petitioner a t  14, Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975); see Strong, Cooperative 
Federalism, 23 IOWA L. REV. 459, 469-70 (1938). But see CORWIN, ATIONAL SUPREMACY 485 
(1913) for the view that the supremacy clause negatives any theory of implied limitations 
on congressional power arising out of the fact of a divided government. 
151. Brief for Petitioner a t  28, Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 246 (3d Cir. 1974) 
(heading in petitioner's brief). 
152. Pennsylvania argued that United States u. California and Maryland v. Wirtz 
control only when states engage in activities which are also carried on by private entities. 
Relying primarily on Justice Frankfurter's opinion in New York v. United States, the state 
argued that "[s]urely there could be no activity which is more definitely a governmental 
activity, no activity which is more clearly an attribute of sovereignty, than enforcement 
of law." Id. a t  29. 
153. 500 F.2d at  259-60. The Third Circuit said that Pennsylvania derived its sover- 
eign state functions argument from Justice Frankfurter's language in New York v. United 
States, 326 U S .  572 (1946). The court discredits Justice Frankfurter's remarks primarily 
for two reasons: (1) Justice Frankfurter only delivered the opinion for a plurality of the 
Court; (2) the Court has held that "the standards developed to define the boundaries of 
state immunity from federal taxation are inapplicable to federal regulation of state activi- 
ties under the Commerce Clause." 500 F.2d a t  261-62. 
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whether they have an impact on interstate commerce.77154 
Based on its review of precedent, the Ninth Circuit in Brown 
v. EPA criticized the Third Circuit's interpretation of Wirtz as 
failing to recognize the difference between a state engaging in 
commerce and a state regulating the commerce of others (gover- 
nance of commerce). 1 5 T 0  the Ninth Circuit, California's 
"governance of the use of highways and automobiles" is outside 
the scope of the federal power, whereas the state's use of the 
highways is not.15This crucial distinction, stated the court, was 
recognized by Chief Justice Hughes in his statement that "the 
subject of federal power is still 'commerce,' [and not gover- 
nance] and not all commerce but commerce with foreign nations 
and among the several States."157 The Ninth Circuit also believed 
that language in Justice Harlan's opinion in Maryland v. Wirtz 
recognized the distinction. Justice Harlan quoted Chief Justice 
Hughes' statement and added that  "[tlhe Court has ample 
power to prevent 'the utter destruction of the state as a sovereign 
political entity.' "15R 
The Third Circuit in Pennsylvania v. EPA, however, did not 
review these statements as recognizing a significant limit to the 
commerce power. To the court, Chief Justice Hughes' language 
did nothing more than reaffirm "that the power to regulate com- 
merce is limited to activities that affect interstate or foreign com- 
merce."lB The Third Circuit reasoned that this fact, plus the 
caution that "Congress may not use a relatively trivial impact on 
commerce as an excuse for broad, general regulation of state or 
private activities," led the Supreme Court in Maryland v. Wirtz 
to its conclusion that "the Court has ample power to prevent. . . 
the utter destruction of the state as a sovereign political 
entity."160 
Following the Third Circuit's reasoning, the Court's ample 
power to protect the state can only be exercised if the state activi- 
ties either do not affect interstate commerce a t  all or have only -a 
trivial impact on commerce. Under the Supreme Court's present 
expansive interpretation of the commerce clause, i t  is not likely 
that many federal actions would be limited by the Third Circuit's 
154. Id .  at 261. 
155. 521 F.2d at 838 n.45; see notes 166-173 and accompanying text infra. 
156. 521 F.2d at 838. 
157. Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. NLRB, 303 US. 453, 466 (1938). 
158. Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U S .  183, 196 (1968). 
159. 500 F.2d a t  260. 
160. Id. 
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view of the Court's "ample power."161 Fortunately for the states, 
Pennsylvania v. EPA was the only one of the circuits' decisions 
to completely reject the states' constitutional arguments. 
2. The  Fourth and Nin th  Circuits favor the states' 
constitutional arguments 
The three circuits that recognized the existence of a constitu- 
tional limit to the commerce power were necessarily confronted 
with the problem of defining the scope of that limit. In the ab- 
sence of any clear statement by the Supreme Court on the issue, 
it is not surprising that the courts reached different conclusions. 
The Fourth Circuit in Maryland v. EPA recognized that 
some type of linedrawing was desirable and turned for assistance 
to Justice Frankfurter's discussion in New York v. United States 
concerning the limits of federal powers. Justice Frankfurter, al- 
though recognizing the constraints of the Tenth Amendment on 
federal powers, rejected the state's contention that its govern- 
mental functions were immune from federal taxation.lfi2 Never- 
theless, he did recognize that a narrower class of state activities 
were immune from federal taxation. The Fourth Circuit quoted 
with approval Justice Frankfurter's comment that federal powers 
do not extend to "State activities and State-owned property that 
partake of uniqueness from the point of view of intergovern- 
mental relations."lm Having determined that some unique state 
-- 
161. See note 114 supra. 
162. New York v. United States, 326 U S .  572, 580 (1946). 
163. Id. a t  582. The Third Circuit, however, rejected Justice Frankfurter's language, 
reasoning that the limits imposed on the federal taxing power do not apply to the federal 
commerce power. See note 153 supra. The Third Circuit's assertion is correct in that the 
Court in United States u. California did reject the taxing power analogy as applied to the 
commerce power. For this reason, then, the decision in New York u. United States would 
have no binding precedental effect on lower courts dealing with issues involving limits to 
the commerce power. Nevertheless, Justice Frankfurter's statements, although dicta, were 
not confined to the federal taxing power. Justice Frankfurter argued that the taxing power 
should be interpreted as broadly as was the commerce power in United States u. 
California. This is evident by his rejection of the governmental v. proprietary distinction 
plus his statement that the taxing power has no less reach than the commerce power. 
Justice Frankfurter's point of view, then, was similar to  the Court's in United States u. 
California. Both rejected the governmental v. proprietary distinction and both viewed the 
congressional power involved as expansive. In this context, it would seem that Justice 
Frankfurter's comments do apply to the commerce clause. 
The Third Circuit summarized Justice Frankfurter's reasoning that certain unique 
state activities are immune from federal taxation as concluding that the federal taxing 
power is limited to "nondiscriminatory" taxes. 500 F.2d a t  261 n.23. The Third Circuit 
claims that four members of the Court in New York v. United States rejected Justice 
Frankfurter's reasoning. Id. Analysis of Justice Stone's concurrence, however, shows that 
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activities cannot be regulated by the federal government, the 
court then quoted language in In re Duncan1" proclaiming the 
essential nature of a state legislature's right to pass or not to pass 
laws TO the Fourth Circuit, then, an implicit constitutional 
limit to the commerce power does exist, can be defined, and was 
exceeded by the EPA. 
Justice Frankfurter's reference to "unique state activities," 
cited with approval by the Fourth Circuit in Maryland u. EPA, 
appears similar to the Ninth Circuit's position that the federal 
commerce power does not extend to a state's governance of com- 
merce. The Fourth Circuit only identifies one unique governmen- 
tal function, the right of the state's legislature to pass or not to 
pass laws. The Ninth Circuit's concept of governance, however, 
includes some or all of a state's police powers, although the dis- 
tinction between a state's economic activities and the exercise of 
its police power over these activities is not clearly explained.lfi6 
The court illustrates its theory by reasoning that a state's opera- 
tion of a railroad is an "economic activity indistinguishable from 
that of private parties," whereas its exercise of the police power 
over the use of highways and automobiles is governance. 
This example is used to contrast the facts in United States 
u. California with those of Brown u. EPA.16' But the Third Circuit 
even though these four members of the Court did not accept an analysis based on discrimi- 
nation, they did accept a concept of constitutionally protected state sovereignty. Moreo- 
ver, it appears that the four concurring justices' view of the scope of constitutional protec- 
tion extended to sovereign state activities that were not discriminatory. These justices 
indicated that a nondiscriminatory tax may nonetheless be unlawful if it burdens sover- 
eign state activities. Id. a t  586-87; see Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 555-56 (1975) 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
164. 139 U.S. 449 (1891). 
165. 8 ENVIR. EP. DEC. at  1112, quoting In re Duncan, 139 U.S. 449, 461 (1891): 
By the Constitution, a republican form of government is guaranteed to 
every State in the Union, and the distinguishing feature of that form is the right 
of the people to choose their own officers for governmental administration, and 
pass their own laws in virtue of the legislative power reposed in representative 
bodies. 
166. The Ninth Circuit explains that a state's exercise of its police power with respect 
to an economic activity which affects commerce is "governance." The court then contrasts 
a state's governance with "an economic activity indistinguishable from that of private 
parties." The court appears to say that governance does not include economic activities 
which affect interstate commerce. However, many exercises of the police power (gover- 
nance) are economic activities which affect interstate commerce. The Ninth Circuit's 
concept of governance, then, is probably limited to a narrow range of police power activi- 
ties which cannot be termed economic activities. See note 172 infra. 
167. 521 F.2d a t  838. The Third Circuit in Pennsylvania v.  EPA saw as a close analogy 
to the situation before it "a state-owned railway system created and maintained for use 
by private railway companies." 500 F.2d a t  261 n.22. The court concluded that Congress 
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in Pennsylvania v .  EPA argued that the only difference in the two 
sets of facts is historical: railroads are operated by public and 
private concerns and automotive transportation systems are oper- 
ated only by state and local governments.lM To the Third Circuit 
this difference is irrelevantY The Ninth Circuit would probably 
agree that the difference in the operation or ownership of a given 
economic activity is irrelevant but argue that whether the state 
governs the activity's use through exercise of its police power is 
entirely relevant. Even if private enterprises operated automotive 
transportation systems, the state would still govern their use by 
enacting and enforcing traffic laws. Clearly, these activities 
would be characterized by the Ninth Circuit as governance of 
commerce and hence immune from federal intervention. 
From this analysis, it is evident that both the Fourth and 
Ninth Circuits believe that any federal regulation which forces 
the states to pass laws is impermissible. The Ninth Circuit's posi- 
tion, however, appears to extend protection to state administra- 
tive functions encompassed by the state police power.170 The 
scope of the Fourth Circuit's unique governmental activity testI7l 
could require the "state to operate it in such a way as to deal with a problem, like safety 
or air pollution which affects interstate commerce." Id. 
The Ninth Circuit's governance test would probably lead to the same conclusion. A 
state as an owner and operator of the railroad system would be subject to the same 
congressional regulation of its economic activities as would a private owner and operator 
of railroads. However, under the Ninth Circuit's analysis, the state's regulation of the use 
of its railroads and the railroads of others through enacting and enforcing laws would be 
governance. This conclusion is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the state 
activities regulated by Congress in Maryland v .  Wirtz and Fry u. United States. The Ninth 
Circuit says "[tlhese cases establish that the payment of wages by states to certain types 
of state employees is an economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce 
and is thus subject to those regulations imposed by Congress which were then before the 
Court." 521 F.2d at  838 (emphasis added). The state would not exercise "its police power 
with respect to an economic activity which affects commerce" when it acts as an employer 
in the payment of wages, nor would it as the owner and operator of a railroad. 
168. 500 F.2d a t  261. 
169. Id. 
170. A state's power to provide for the general welfare (police power) is broad indeed. 
As the Third Circuit indicates, Pennsylvania's compliance with the Administrator's plan 
would "require the Commonwealth to exercise its legislative and administrative powers." 
500 F.2d a t  262 (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit's governance test, based on the 
police power, apparently encompasses not only legislative functions, but certain adminis- 
trative functions as well. 
171. The Fourth Circuit focused on the "unique" right of a state to pass or not to 
pass laws. The court does not say whether other state activities would be protected from 
federal regulation. Nevertheless, the court derived its theory from Justice Frankfurter 
who, from his examples given of "unique" state activities, apparently intended the class 
of protected activities to be quite narrow. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 
582 ( 1946). 
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and the Ninth Circuit's governance test are not clearly delim- 
ited.172 Nevertheless, both tests, without reversing prior preced- 
ent, operate to make only a narrow class of state activities im- 
mune from congressional regulation pursuant to the commerce 
power. 
3. District of Columbia Circuit 
Like the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, the D.C. Circuit in 
District of Columbia u. Train recognized a limit on congressional 
exercise of the commerce power and attempted to define its 
scope. In so doing, the court appeared to take an intermediate 
position on the constitutional issues between the Third Circuit on 
one hand and the Fourth and Ninth Circuits on the other.174 Pri- 
marily relying on language in Wirtz, the court concluded: 
Once Congress has properly determined that  the emission 
of pollutants into the air has an effect on interstate commerce, 
it has power to regulate activities which generate that pollution 
either directly or indirectly, and it is irrelevant that a particular 
source of pollution is operated by the state.'75 
Based on this reasoning, the D.C. Circuit apparently went 
beyond the approach taken by the Fourth and Ninth Circuits by 
allowing Congress to regulate the state's streets, highways, and 
bus systems. Specifically, the court concluded that Congress can 
require the states to purchase buses and to construct exclusive 
bus lanes even a t  great expense.176 To the D.C. Circuit, then, the 
172. The scope of the Ninth Circuit's governance test is also unclear. See note 166 
supra. Even though the court defines governance in broad terms of police power regula- 
tion, California argued that only those state activities which cannot in principle be per- 
formed by private parties are protected from commerce power regulation. The only exam- 
ple of this class of activities given by California is the enactment and enforcement of state 
laws. Brief for Petitioner a t  22, Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975). 
173. See notes 127-134 and accompanying text supra. 
174. The D.C. Circuit in District of Columbia u. Train did not refer to either the 
Fourth or Ninth Circuit decisions. The reason for this omission is not known as both the 
Ninth and Fourth Circuit opinions came down prior to District of Colombia v. Train; the 
Ninth Circuit's opinion is dated August 15, 1975; the Fourth Circuit's, September 19, 
1975; and the D.C. Circuit's, October 28, 1975. In contrast, the Fourth Circuit's opinion, 
rendered a little over a month after the Ninth Circuit's, cites Brown v. EPA as support 
for its views of the constitutional issues. 8 ENVIR. REP. DEC. a t  1113. 
As the D.C. Circuit cited the Third Circuit's opinion several times, 521 F.2d at  988, 
991, 994, 994 n.7, i t  is logical to assume that the court was unaware of the Ninth and 
Fourth Circuit decisions when drafting its opinion. 
175. 521 F.2d a t  989. 
176. Id. The court realized that the purchase of 475 buses and the construction of 
many miles of exclusive bus lanes may be financially burdensome, but found it permissi- 
ble based on the following language from the Supreme Court's decision in Employees of 
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rationale of United States v. California and Wirtz extends to 
allow apparently unlimited regulation of state activities that di- 
rectly or indirectly17' affect interstate commerce. 
The court next addressed the Administrator's inspection and 
maintenance regulations and his retrofit  regulation^.'^^ In con- 
trast to the bus and bus lane provisions, these regulations are 
ultimately aimed at  the individual automobile owner, not the 
state. Furthermore, as the court recognized, "each federally- 
promulgated regulation includes provisions ordering the states to 
enact statutes and to establish and administer programs to force 
their citizens to comply with this federal d i re~t ive ." '~~ In analyz- 
ing the constitutionality of these various regulations, the court 
determined that the proper standard of inquiry was developed by 
Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden when he said that the 
federal commerce power was a "power to regulate; that is, to 
prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed."lU0 
the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U S .  
279, 284 (1973): "[Wlhen Congress does act [under the commerce power] it may place 
new or even enormous fiscal burdens on the States." 
In that case, employees of Missouri sought overtime pay due them under the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, which was applied to  the states by Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 
183 (1968). Missouri argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred suit against it in federal 
court. The Supreme Court upheld the state's argument, 411 U S .  a t  286-87. The quoted 
statement, then, appears to be dictum. In addition, the Supreme Court neither cites 
authority for this statement nor explains its scope. I t  is not clear, then, whether the 
language means the cost to a state of complying with a federal program is irrelevant or 
whether there is a point at  which the financial burdens become too enormous to be 
allowed. 
177. The Administrator defines an indirect source as 
one that encourages mobile source pollution a t  locations not necessarily coinci- 
dent with the source itself by serving as  a trip attraction for automobile drivers, 
or which provides a parking or driving convenience. 
38 Fed. Reg. 30,632 (1973). The Administrator lists a "high-speed highway" as an example 
of an indirect source of pollution controlled by the state. Id. 
178. The EPA's retrofit regulations require certain vehicles to be equipped with me- 
chanical devices, or in other ways altered, in order to reduce the emission of air pollutants. 
For examples of such regulations see, e.g., the EPA's plan for the District of Columbia, 
40 C.F.R. §§  54.492, .494-96 (1974); and the EPA's retrofit regulations for Virginia, 40 
C.F.R. §§ 52.2446-47 (1974). 
179. 521 F.2d a t  990. 
180. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824). The language quoted by the court precedes 
Marshall's famous statement that "[tlhis power, like all others vested in Congress, is 
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, 
other than are prescribed in the constitution." Id. 
By focusing on the meaning of the word "regulate," the court takes an unusual 
approach to the problem of defining the limits of the congressional power to "regulate 
commerce." Most of the previous efforts a t  approaching the problem have focused on the 
definition of "commerce." For example, the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the problem 
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Applying this standard, the court reasoned that Congress has 
authority to force the states to administer federally promulgated 
plans if the federal plan is directed to traditional state activities 
like registering and licensing motor vehicles.lR1 To the court, this 
is valid congressional regulation of commerce. Nevertheless, the 
court struck down the inspection and retrofit requirements that 
do not involve such traditional functions but go beyond valid 
regulation by forcing the states to enact statutes and become 
involved in "administering the details of the regulatory 
scheme."182 
I t  appears that the court in District of Columbia u. Train 
used the "regulation" test to accomplish the same result it feels 
is not justified solely by reliance on the Tenth Amendment. Al- 
though the court cited with approval the language in Fry referring 
to the important constitutional role of the Tenth Amendment, 
the court correctly points out that "[tlhe [Supreme] Court has 
not yet made clear exactly what sort of restraints the Tenth 
Amendment does place on federal action under the commerce 
clause."183 Because of this, the court's conclusion from its analysis 
of Wirtz and Fry was an "additional ground" for setting aside the 
inspection and retrofit regulations.lS4 The same factors that led 
the court to conclude that the inspection and maintenance regu- 
lations are a drastic invasion of state sovereignty prohibited by 
the Tenth Amendment led the court to conclude that these provi- 
sions go beyond valid regulation of commerce.185 In either case, 
the degree of federal intrusion was the focal point of the court's 
analysis. By reaching the desired result through a restrictive defi- 
nition of regulation, the D.C. Circuit obscured its reasoning. 
distinguished between "governance" and "commerce," but did not question the meaning 
of the word "regulate." 521 F.2d at 838-39. 
181. 521 F.2d a t  991. The court was careful to point out the reasoning which led to 
its decision to allow the Administrator to control state licensing activities: 
[Tlhe federal regulation is directly related to existing activities presently being 
carried on by the states, and it does not specify the manner in which the state 
is to comply. A state may comply with the prohibition on registering noncon- 
forming vehicles merely by requiring applicants for vehicle registration to sub- 
mit a certificate of compliance obtained from federal officials or from private 
sources not manned by state personnel. 
Id. a t  991-92. 
182. Id. at 992. 
183. Id. at 993. 
184. Id. at 994. 
185. Id. a t  992. 
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4. A comparison of the three tests 
The approach taken by the D.C. Circuit should be contrasted 
with the Ninth Circuit's governance test. As previously men- 
tioned, the Ninth Circuit in Brown u. EPA illustrated its gover- 
nance theory by contrasting the facts in United States u. 
California with those of the instant case. la To the court in Brown 
u. EPA, the state's operation of a railroad, an "economic activity 
indistinguishable from that of private parties," is very much dif- 
ferent from a state's exercise of its police power to govern the use 
of highways and a~tornobi1es.l~~ In contrast, the court in District 
of Columbia u. Train views "state-owned transportation systems 
as  analogous to the railroad operated by the state in United 
States u. Ca l i f~ rn ia . "~~This  analogy is used by the court to sup- 
port its decision to uphold the Administrator's regulations which 
require the states to purchase buses, construct bus lanes, and 
regulate the registration of noncomplying vehicles. 
The Ninth Circuit's governance test probably would not 
allow these provisions. The federal plan promulgated by the 
Administrator for California contained several bus lane provi- 
sionsl" and a prohibition against registering noncomplying vehi- 
~les.~~"ll of these provisions were struck down by the Ninth 
Circuit in Brown based on its interpretation of the Clean Air 
Act.lS1 The court's view of the constitutionality of these regula- 
tions appears to parallel its conclusions based on construction of 
the Act.lg2 
Clearly, the registration and licensing of vehicles is an exer- 
- -  - 
186. See note 167 and accompanying text supra. 
187. 521 F.2d at 838. 
188. 521 F.2d at 989. 
189. For example, the exclusive bus lane provisions for the San Diego Intrastate Air 
Quality Control Region, 40 C.F.R. 6 52.258 (1974), and those for the Los Angeles Region, 
40 C.F.R. 6 52.263 (1974). 
190. 40 C.F.R. 6 52.244(d) (1974). 
191. 521 F.2d at 831-32. 
192. The Ninth Circuit discussed the constitutional issues at some length. From the 
court's favorable attitude toward the state's arguments and its rejection of the Adminis- 
trator's position, 521 F.2d at 837-39, it appears the court's view of the constitutional issues 
would lead it to the same result as its holding based on interpretation of the statute which 
struck down the exclusive bus lane and vehicle registration provisions. In reference to the 
Third Circuit's decision, the court said: 
We recognize that our views both with regard to the interpretation of the 
Clean Air Act and the constitutional issues here discussed differ from those 
expressed in Pennsylvania v. Environmental Protection Agency, 500 F.2d 246 
(3d Cir. 1974). 
521 F.2d a t  838 n.45 (emphasis added). 
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cise of the state's police power and not an economic activity indis- 
tinguishable from that of private parties. It is not as clear, how- 
ever, that the construction of exclusive bus lanes and the pur- 
chase of new buseslg3 constitute "the governance of the use of 
highways and automobiles." Arguably, the construction of exclu- 
sive bus lanes is governance and not commerce since the high- 
ways involved are owned solely by the state.lg4 Yet the actual 
physical activity required, construction of roads, is also to some 
degree "an economic activity indistinguishable from that of pri- 
vate parties" in the sense that private parties can and do con- 
struct roads.lg5 In that respect, construction of roads is analogous 
to state ownership of a railroad treated in United States v. 
California and would fall within the rationale of that case as 
explained in Wirtz: "If a State is engaging in economic activities 
that are validly regulated by the Federal Government when en- 
gaged in by private persons, the State too may be forced to con- 
form its activities to federal regulation."lg6 
In Maryland v. EPA, the Fourth Circuit recognized that a 
state's right to pass or not to pass laws was a unique state activity 
and therefore not subject to federal regulation. Although appar- 
ently not basing its decision on constitutional considerations, the 
court held that the EPA could not "require Maryland to establish 
the programs and furnish legal authority for the administration 
thereof."lg7 The court thereby set aside the entire inspection and 
maintenance program and retrofit programs, including the licens- 
ing provisions. lg8 
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit allowed the licensing provisions, 
although setting aside the majority of the EPA's inspection, 
maintenance, and retrofit programs. In so doing, the court admit- 
ted that because of its approach, "the states may have to enact 
193. There is no provision in the EPA's plan for California requiring that state to 
purchase buses. See 40 C.F.R. $ 0  52.220 et seq. (1974). 
194. The Third Circuit, based on its argument that historical circumstances resulted 
in state and local governments monopolizing control over local automobile transportation 
systems and not over railways, would seemingly reject this argument. See Pennsylvania 
v. EPA, 500 F.2d at  261 and notes 167-169 and accompanying text supra. 
195. In Brown v. EPA, the state argued that state activities which cannot in principle 
be performed by private parties are protected from federal regulation. See note 172 supra. 
Based on this reasoning, the construction of exclusive bus lanes is probably not a protected 
activity. Even though in fact the state alone will construct the bus lanes, in principle, 
private parties also could construct such lanes. 
196. 392 U S .  a t  197. 
197. 8 ENVIR. REP. DEC. a t  1114-15. 
198. Id. at 1115. 
1970 AMENDMENTS TO CLEAN AIR ACT 
auxiliary statutes or state regulations to carry out the federal 
regulation . . . . 9 7  199 
There is no indication in Maryland v. EPA that the Fourth 
Circuit's view of the constitutional issues would countenance 
such an approach. The court set aside all of the EPA's regulations 
that required the states to legislate. The presence of this one 
objectionable feature was determinative to the Fourth Circuit. To 
the D.C. Circuit in District of Columbia v. Train, however, fed- 
eral regulations which require the state to enact some "auxiliary 
statutes or state regulations" are permissible if certain other lim- 
iting factors are present.200 
5. The guarantee clause201 
In two of the four circuits, the states presented a rather 
unique constitutional argument in addition to arguing the Tenth 
Amendment as evidence of an implicit constitutional limit to the 
commerce power.202 In Brown v. EPA, California argued that the 
Administrator's interpretation of the Act would result in an 
abridgment of the state's constitutional guarantee to a republican 
form of government.203 Essentially, California's argument was 
that the federal government, by requiring a state to enforce fed- 
eral plans, could exercise ever increasing control over state ex- 
penditures. This "severance of spending from taxing at  the state 
level" would seriously impair the state's republican form of gov- 
ernment as the congressional representatives from other states 
would "dilute the strength of the voters [of California] whose 
revenues would be spent as Congress direct~."~~VI'his argument, 
199. 521 F.2d at  987. 
200. See note 181 supra and text accompanying notes 226-227 infra. 
201. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4: "The United States shall guarantee to every State in 
this Union a Republican Form of Government . . . ." 
202. A guarantee clause argument was recognized by the courts in District of Colum- 
bia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 981 (D.C. Cir. 1975) and Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 838 (9th 
Cir. 1975), but was addressed only by the Ninth Circuit. 
203. 521 F.2d at  838. 
204. Id. The Ninth Circuit in Brown cited the writings of Montesquieu and the 
Federalist papers in support of California's guarantee clause argument. Id. Madison in 
The Federalist contrasts the theories of republicanism, nationalism and federalism. In 
speaking of a republic Madison said: 
[W]e may define a republic to be, or a t  least may bestow that name on, a 
government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great 
body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their offices during 
pleasure, for a limited period, or during good behavior. It is essential to such a 
government that it be derived from the great body of society . -. . . 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, a t  280-81 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Montesquieu simi- 
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if successful, would give the state's federalism argument a consti- 
tutional basis. 
a. General rule of nonjusticiability. Even though by article 
IV, section 4 the federal government is responsible for guarantee- 
ing to the states a republican form of government, the courts have 
consistently held that  questions arising under the guarantee 
clause are nonjusticiable political q u e ~ t i o n s . ~ ~ W o s t  of these 
cases, however, involved alleged interference with a state's guar- 
antee to a republican government by the state itself or individuals 
within the state.206 In contrast, in Brown v. EPA the threat to the 
state's republican form of government was from congressional 
and executive, not state or individual action. The federal govern- 
ment, the guarantor of the states' right to a republican govern- 
ment, was the very party accused of the violation. 
larly spoke of the right of the people to elect their representatives as being the essence of 
a republican form of government. 1 MONTESQUIEU'S SPIRIT OF LAWS 8 (J. Pritchard rev. ed. 
1902). It appears, then, that these two authorities would agree that dilution of the elec- 
torate's control over local fiscal matters would impair a state's republican form of govern- 
ment. 
205. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 
U.S. 118 (1911); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). In Baker v. Carr, the Court 
declared the guarantee clause claim to be nonjusticiable, but upheld the equal protection 
argument based on the same facts. 369 U.S. a t  227, 237. For a further discussion of Baker 
u. Carr see'note 207 infra. 
The Ninth Circuit, while discussing the guarantee clause issue a t  some length did not 
mention the problem of nonjusticiability. Its failure to do so may be explained by the 
court's merely giving its "opinion" of the constitutional issues while basing its decision 
on statutory construction. 
206. In the 1849 case of Luther v. Borden, the Supreme Court determined for the first 
time that ehforcement of the guarantee clause was a nonjusticiable political question. The 
case arose out of the Dorr Rebellion, a unique event in American history. In 1841, a group 
of citizens in Rhode Island led by Dorr organized, adopted a new constitution, and claimed 
to be the official government of the state. The Supreme Court was called upon to decide 
which government would be recognized by the United States. Chief Justice Taney, in 
refusing to pass on the question, reasoned that Congress was the proper branch of govern- 
ment to decide such political questions. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 43 (1849). 
Even though the Court's treatment of the nonjusticiability issue in Borden appeared 
to be dictum, the reasoning of the Court has been very influential to subsequent courts 
dealing with guarantee clause claims. See B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL L W 55 (1972); 
Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REV. 485, 507 
(1924). 
In Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118,151 (1911), the Court refused 
to decide a challenge to a 1902 amendment to the Oregon constitution which contained 
the following provision: 
But the people reserve to themselves power to propose laws and amendments 
to the constitution and to enact or reject the same a t  the polls, independent of 
the legislative assembly, and also reserve power a t  their own option to approve 
or reject a t  the polls any act of the legislative assembly. 
ORE. CONST. art. 4, 8 1 (1902). 
For a discussion of Baker u. Carr see note 207 infra. 
1891 1970 AMENDMENTS TO CLEAN AIR ACT 227 
Even so, the Supreme Court has recently determined that  
"challenges to congressional action on the ground of inconsis- 
tency with the [guarantee] clause present no justiciable ques- 
ti~n."~"'  The Court based this conclusion primarily on its decision 
in Georgia v. S t a n t ~ n . ~ O ~  In Stanton, Georgia sued to enjoin execu- 
tion of the Reconstruction Acts, alleging that enforcement of the 
acts would destroy its present form of government209 which i t  
claimed was republican in "every political, legal, constitutional, 
and juridical sense."210 The Court determined that the issue in- 
volved was a nonjusticiable political question .211 Thus, even in 
this extreme case where the very existence of the state's govern- 
ment was jeopardized by federal action, the Court refused to hear 
the state's guarantee clause claim. 
b. Possible exception to the rule may support states' 
arguments. I t  has been suggested that the Supreme Court case 
of Coyle v. Smith212 acts as a limitation upon the general rule of 
- - 
207. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 224 (1962) (emphasis added). This case was a 
landmark decision in the area of reapportionment. The appellants, residents of Tennessee, 
were successful in arguing that their votes were "debased" because the state legislature 
was not reapportioned after a substantial growth and redistribution in the state's popula- 
tion. Different members of the Court in Baker u. Carr expressed dissatisfaction with the 
rule announced in Luther u. Borden. Justice Douglas took the strongest stance in opposi- 
tion to a general application of the political question doctrine. He felt that many of the 
cases cited by the Court as involving political questions were wrongly decided. 369 U.S. 
a t  241 n.1. Specifically, he said that "[tlhe statements in Luther v.  Borden, that this 
guarantee is enforceable only by Congress or the Chief Executive is not maintainable." 
Justice Douglas intimated that the doctrine arose out of a peculiar fact situation and that 
its general application would therefore be inappropriate. Justice Douglas felt that the 
doctrine was particularly inapplicable to voting rights cases where the Court has given 
"the full panoply of judicial protection to voting rights." Id. a t  242 n.2. 
Also, the dissent criticized the majority for their treatment of the issue. The majority 
found that although the guarantee clause claim was not justiciable the appellants' equal 
protection claim was. In response to this approach, Justice Frankfurter said in dissent: 
"The present case involves all the elements that have made the Guarantee Clause cases 
non-justiciable. It is in effect, a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different 
label." Id. a t  297. 
Even the majority made it clear that guarantee clause claims are only nonjusticiable 
because they "involve those elements which define a 'political question.' " Id. a t  218. The 
majority's review of precedent lists six of these elements, one of which must be present 
for a given case to be ruled nonjusticiable. This process, said the Court, necessitates a 
"discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and posture of the particular case, and the 
impossibility of resolution by any semantic cataloguing." Id. a t  217. 
208. 73 U S .  (6 Wall.) 50 (1867). 
209. Id. a t  50-51. The Act of March 2, 1867, entitled "An act to provide for the more 
efficient government of the rebel States," provided that no legal state government existed 
in Georgia and until a government approved by Congress could be established the state 
was to be part of a military district controlled by the President. Id. 
210. Id. a t  65. 
211. Id. a t  77. 
212. 221 U.S. 559 (1911). 
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nonj~sticiability.~'~ In Coyle, the Court indicated that the guar- 
antee clause may impose a duty on the federal government not 
to deprive the states of their republican form of government. In 
the case, Oklahoma challenged the validity of the Enabling Act 
of June 16, 1906,214 which restricted the power of the state to 
determine the location of its capitol city, to determine when and 
how to change the location, and to appropriate public funds for 
that purpose. Noting that the powers limited by the Enabling Act 
"are essentially and peculiarly state powers,"215 the Court said 
that the guarantee clause "may imply the duty of such new State 
to provide itself with such State government, and impose upon 
Congress the duty of seeing that such form is not changed to one 
anti-republican-but it obviously does not confer power to admit 
a new State which shall be any less a State than those which 
compose the Union. "216 
If the decision in Stanton can be limited to the unique histor- 
ical circumstances involved,217 the states in their case against the 
EPA may fall within the rationale of the Court in C ~ y l e . ~ ' ~  In both 
instances, the states claimed that the actions of the federal gov- 
ernment deprived them of powers that are uniquely theirs. In 
Coyle, congressional action deprived a state from locating its own 
center of government, from determining when and how to change 
the location, and from appropriating public funds for that pur- 
pose. These functions were viewed by the Court as "essentially 
- - 
213. Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. L. REV. 
485, 510 (1924). 
214. Ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267. These enabling acts varied from state to state. It is 
interesting to note that Utah's contained a provision prohibiting plural marriage, which 
many of the other state enabling acts did not. Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 560 (1910). 
215. 221 US.  at  565. 
216. Id. at  567-68. 
217. The Union, having been split by Civil War, sought once again to unite under a 
common government. The existing government of Georgia, by refusing to grant the right 
to vote to Negroes, was declared unrepublican in nature by Congress. Georgia's claim to 
be a republican government in all respects certainly is not compelling to a society such 
as ours today accustomed to universal suffrage. 
218. Coyle u. Smith was cited by one commentator for the proposition that "[tlhere 
are limitations on the scope of the things which can be accomplished under the guaranty 
[sic] clause." Field, The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts, 8 MINN. 
L. REV. 485, 509 (1924). This statement suggests that the holding in Coyle may be limited 
to cases where the federal government attempts to use the guarantee clause as authority 
for some affirmative action. Although it is true that in Coyle Congress cited the guarantee 
clause to justify its legislation, the absence of an affirmative use of the guarantee clause 
here should not distinguish the circuit cases from Coyle. The ultimate impact on the states 
in each instance is similar, for in both instances federal action interfered with the state's 
exercise of essential and peculiar state powers. 
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and peculiarly state powers."21s In the states' dispute with the 
EPA, the states claimed and the Administrator conceded that the 
Administrator's interpretation of the Act would force their state 
representatives to legislate. Certainly the right of a state to enact 
laws is also essentially and peculiarly a state power.220 
6. Summary 
In summary, all of the circuits recognized that due to the 
decisions in United States v. California and Maryland v. Wirtz, 
the Administrator can control state activities that are direct 
sources of pollution.221 The D.C. Circuit, although not going as far 
as did the Third Circuit in Pennsylvania v. EPA, did, like the 
Third Circuit, extend the rationale of the Supreme Court cases 
to allow the EPA to regulate state activities that are an indirect 
source of pollution. The Third Circuit interpreted Wirtz as allow- 
ing the federal government to regulate state activities in the same 
manner as private activities, the determining factor being 
whether the activity in question has an effect on interstate com- 
m e r ~ e . ~ ~ ~  The Fourth and Ninth Circuits, on the other hand, made 
no distinction between direct and indirect sources of pollution, 
but apparently saw the Supreme Court cases as applicable only 
to state activities that directly pollute the air.223 
Both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits objected primarily to the 
EPA's inspection and maintenance programs and its retrofit pro- 
g r a m ~ . ~ ~ ~  These regulations required the states to enact and ad- 
minister programs in order to force their citizens to comply with 
the federal pollution control plan. Both courts viewed the EPA's 
219. 221 US.  at 565. 
220. See note 165 supra. 
221. This result accords with the courts' view of statutory construction, since # 113 
applies to all "persons" who violate the Act, and 5 302(e) of the Act includes state and 
local governments as "persons." 42 U.S.C. § 1857h(e) (1970). See notes 64-69 and accom- 
panying text supra. 
The Ninth Circuit stated: "Tersely put, the Act, as we see it, permits sanctions 
against a state that pollutes the air, but not against a state that chooses not to govern 
polluters as the Administrator directs." 521 F.2d at  832. 
222. 500 F.2d at  261. 
223. The D.C. Circuit allows the Administrator's regulations that require the states 
to construct exclusive bus lanes and purchase new buses by identifying the state's streets, 
highways, and bus systems as indirect sources of pollution. 521 F.2d at  989-90. On the 
other hand, the Ninth and Fourth Circuits set aside similar provisions of California's and 
Maryland's federally imposed plans, as discussed notes 189-192, 197-198 and accompany- 
ing text supra. 
224. The Fourth Circuit viewed these provisions as "astonishing regulations." 8 
ENVIR. REP. DEC. at  1111. 
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requirements in these areas as unconstitutional interference with 
sovereign state legislative or regulatory functions.225 The D.C. Cir- 
cuit also emphasized the substantial invasion of state sovereignty 
created by these regulations, but allowed the EPA's regulation 
prohibiting the state from licensing nonconforming vehicles. The 
court viewed this exception as compelled by the result in United 
States u. California, but was careful to point out the existence of 
factors qualifying this exception. Simply put, it appears that the 
court recognized two factors that must exist in order for the fed- 
eral government to constitutionally require a state to administer 
a federal regulatory scheme. The state role must (1) be limited 
to traditional state activitiesZ2%md (2) not involve the state in 
extensive use of its lawmaking or regulatory powers, including use 
of its personnel and resources.227 Thus, the decision in District of 
225. The Attorney General of the United States, Edward H. Levi, found similar 
constitutional faults with various provisions of the proposed National No-fault Act. 
Hearings on S. 354 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 496 
(1975). The Attorney General pointed out that the No-fault Act would, as emphasized by 
Mr. Robert G. Dixon, require the states to "devote their funds and personnel, and to create 
agencies and facilities to administer a Federal law, regardless of local feeling." Id. at 497. 
Levi distinguishes the United States v. California - Maryland v. Wirtz line of cases 
as "cases where the State mechanism was regarded as similar to that of any private 
employer or entrepreneur." Id. a t  498. 
The Attorney General recognized that the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 contain 
many of the infirmities of the National No-fault Bill. In reference to Pennsylvania o. EPA, 
he states: "I do not know whether the existence of this third circuit case should give 
particular comfort to anyone concerned about principles of federalism." Id. a t  499. Never- 
theless, reasons Levi, "the reference to the 10th amendment in Fry, the strong dissent in 
Fry and the Supreme Court's action in setting down for reargument the National League 
of Cities case and staying the operation of the recent amendments to the statute which 
raise the question in that case all indicate that the issue involved here is a serious one, 
located a t  the margin of constitutionality." Id. at 500. 
At the end of 1974, in an unpublished opinion, a three-judge district court denied a 
preliminary injunction and dismissed the plaintiffs complaint in National League of 
Cities v. Brennan, Civil No. 74-1812 (D.D.C., Dec. 31, 1974). The plaintiffs sought to 
enjoin enforcement of parts of the 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act and 
related regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor which would have applied the 
Act to all nonsupervisory state and municipal employees, including police and firemen. 
On appeal to Chief Justice Burger as Circuit Justice of the D.C. Circuit, the Chief 
Justice explained that the three-judge court viewed the case as raising "a difficult and 
substantial question of law" although they felt that the Supreme Court's decision in 
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) controlled the matter. Sharing the lower court's 
"doubts and concerns," Chief Justice Burger ordered arguments before the entire Court. 
National League of Cities v. Brennan, 419 U.S. 1321, 1323 (1974). 
226. See note 181 supra. 
227. 521 F.2d at 992. The court says the following concerning the Administrator's 
inspection and maintenance regulations and retrofit regulations (excluding the licensing 
provisions) : 
In essence, the Administrator is here attempting to commandeer the regula- 
tory powers of the states, along with their personnel and resources, for use in 
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Colurn bia v. Train strikes a balance between the competing con- 
siderations-the extensive federal commerce power and the 
states' right to an independent existence. In striking that bal- 
ance, the court articulated a limitation to congressional exercise 
of the commerce power while accommodating the letter of past 
Supreme Court decisions. 
D. Future Clarification by the Supreme Court 
Both the Ninth and the D.C. Circuits' recognition of the 
states' Tenth Amendment arguments was aided by the Supreme 
Court's treatment of the issue in Fry v. United S ta te~ ,~~Wecided  
after Pennsylvania u. EPA. Although applying the Economic Sta- 
bilization Act to state employees, the Court in Fry explicitly re- 
fers to the Tenth Amendment as declaring the "constitutional 
policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that 
impairs the States' integrity or their ability to function effectively 
in a federal system."229 In addition, the Court was careful to note 
tha t  the federal intrusion in both Wirtz and Fry was "quite 
limited in application" and that the latter case dealt only with 
an emergency measure necessitated by severe economic condi- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  In dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted with approval the 
majority's recognition of the Tenth Amendment as a limit on 
federal power. Realizing that linedrawing is difficult, he never- 
theless argued that Wirtz should be overruled as crossing the line 
between permissible and impermissible federal intrusion in state 
functions.231 The Court's opinion in Fry suggests that the Su- 
preme Court is in a position to side with the D.C., Ninth, and 
Fourth Circuits. Should the Court agree to grant the EPA's peti- 
tion for review of the decisions of those i t  will have an 
opportunity to make it clear that, regardless of how difficult the 
conceptualization, a limit to federal intrusion into state affairs 
does exist, is of constitutional origin, and will be enforced by the 
courts. 
If the Supreme Court accepts the states' coristitutional argu- 
ments, it must deal with language in past cases that appears to 
administering and enforcing a federal regulatory program against the owners of 
motor vehicles. 
Id. 1 
228. 421 U.S. 542 (1975). I 229. Id. at 547 n.7. See text accompanying notes 149-150 supra. 
230. Id. at 548. 
231. Id. at 559. 
232. See note 20 supra. 
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recognize no limits on congressional exercise of the commerce 
power. The position on the constitutional issues taken by the 
Fourth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits indicates an unwillingness to 
extend the conclusions of those Supreme Court cases beyond their 
factual contexts.233 Language by the D.C. Circuit in District of  
Columbia v. Train perhaps expresses the attitude of all three 
circuits toward the liberal extension of the federal commerce 
power by the United States Supreme Court: 
Actually, in extending the commerce power to the tremen- 
dous limits it has been pressed in recent years, the Congress and 
the Courts are most probably exceeding the intent of those who 
wrote the C o n ~ t i t u t i o n . ~ ~ ~  
The court substantiated this view by quoting from a letter written 
by James Madison that indicates his feeling that the commerce 
power was "intended as a negative and preventive provision 
against injustice among the States themselves, rather than as a 
power to be used for the positive purposes of the General Govern- 
ment . . . ."235 TO the court, there was "no question" that the 
commerce power was being used by Congress and the EPA as an 
affirmative tool of federal regulation.236 The court, therefore, con- 
cluded that "[wle recognize the extent to which the Supreme 
Court has expanded the federal commerce power, but we are not 
willing to expand it beyond the limits that Congress specified or 
court decisions presently require."237 
Perhaps the Supreme Court's recognition in Fry that the 
Tenth Amendment has substantive meaning will provide the 
impetus for a renewed effort by the Court to articulate the scope 
of an implicit constitutional limit to the federal commerce power. 
In this important but difficult task, the efforts of the Fourth, 
Ninth, and D.C. Circuits provide a useful framework for future 
judicial analysis. 
233. The Ninth Circuit's governance test was developed to distinguish United States 
v. California, Maryland v. Wirtz, and Fry v. United States. The court said in reference to 
the latter two cases: 
Neither of these cases holds or even suggests that a state's exercise of its police 
power with respect to an economic activity which affects interstate commerce 
is itself an economic activity or 'species of commercial intercourse' subject to 
regulation by Congress. 
521 F.2d at 838. 
The Fourth Circuit's "unique state activity" test also served to distinguish California 
and Wirtz. See Maryland v. EPA, 8 ENVIR. REP. DEC. at 1112. 
234. 521 F.2d a t  992. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. 
